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ABSTRACT
Printing China’s Gold: The American Bank Note Company 
and the Customs Gold Units of 1930
by
Mark David Miller
Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f History 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
In 1928, T V. Soong headed the new Central Bank o f  China to pursue monetary 
reform, redeem bad debts, negotiate with foreign powers in monetary matters, and 
increase customs revenue. The new Nanjing government, headed by Jiang Jishi (Chiang 
Kai-shek), his brother-in-law, realized the importance o f  close ties between government 
and banking through the 1930s and 1940s and involved the United States in their banking 
affairs.
This thesis investigates the activities o f the Central Bank o f  China in the early 
twentieth century. Within the broad spectrum o f  banking, this work focuses on the 
issuance o f certain bank notes by the Chinese government and the participation o f an 
American printing company in that process. This study will also explore China’s 
motivations and attempt to collect its customs revenues on a gold basis. Using newly 
discovered private archival material, it will further examine the issuance o f Customs 
Gold Units in 1930. The result o f  this study will enrich readers about a unique Sino-
III
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American relationship between a domestic central bank and a foreign bank note printer 
against the larger economic relationship between the two countries and the world.
I V
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
By 1928 China found itself in financial chaos. While the successful Northern 
Expedition o f  Jiang Jieshi had routed the communists, the newly established Nanjing 
government needed financial organization, better tax collection, and a respectful process 
to begin paying down its external national debts.' This debt had grown steadily since the 
end o f  the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Outside help from the United States was solicited 
and received from Professor Edwin Kemmerer o f  Princeton University and his group o f 
financial experts. Numerous suggestions were put forth, and many implemented, to help 
China modernize the financial dealings o f  its government. A significant step taken was 
to place China’s customs revenues from abroad on a gold exchange standard. These 
revenues were “ linked” to gold via the development o f a unit o f  exchange called Customs 
Gold Units (CGU). Bank notes in various CGU denominations were utilized to facilitate 
payments. These notes were designed and printed by the American Bank Note Company 
(ABNC) in New York, thus continuing a relationship already established between ABNC 
and various customers in China. This work will review China’s debt, the process o f  the
' In the new er Pinyin nomenclature system, the name for Chiang Kai-shek is Jiang Jieshi. The Pinyin 
system  will be used in this work, with the exceptions o f  Sun Fo, Sun Yat-Sen, and the Soong clan.
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development o f  the Customs Gold Units, their associated bank notes, and their successful 
role in China’s financial reforms. Using new sources, this paper will also discuss the 
design and procurement o f the notes from America and their subsequent issuance and use 
by the Central Bank o f China.
This work had its roots in the study and collection o f paper currency. Over the years, 
China has issued many bank notes — with most printed domestically. However, American 
and other foreign bank note firms had a presence in China since the beginning o f  the 20'*’ 
Century and were providing notes o f  high quality. The value o f  Chinese notes in today’s 
marketplace remains a broad spectrum o f  pricing. And, as any collector knows, rarity, 
quality, and condition o f  the note are its salient components.
Even a superficial look at the 1930 Customs Gold Unit note shows some uniqueness. 
Absent is any printing o f  the words “yuan,” “gold yuan,” or “dollars” as seen on other 
national currency notes. The question quickly arises as to what was the intended use o f  
these notes? And perhaps more importantly, what was the source o f the Customs Gold 
Unit concept? What financial policy did the notes support?
Methodology
These questions identify a need for historical knowledge on this subject. Accord­
ingly, o f the various methods o f qualitative research, this thesis relied most on 
historiography. Generally, there are four types o f  historical evidence: primary sources, 
secondary sources, running records, and recollections. It is the primary sources, and in 
particular the newly discovered ones, on which this study is based.
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The first step was to find out what primary sources were available about these 
particular bank notes. A query was made to the editors o f Bank Note Reporter, the 
leading publication on currency." They put this writer in touch with their expert on Asian 
notes. The subject was discussed with this expert and the question was put forth as to 
what person, company, or organization might own the historical archival materials o f the 
American Bank Note Company (ABNC).
These conversations led to contact with the Arthur Morowitz family in New York 
City. In the course o f conducting his bank note business, Morowitz had procured at 
auction copious amounts o f ABNC archives which were being destroyed as part o f an old 
warehouse demolition project. His intent as a businessman was to search the files for any 
remaining notes -  especially “sample notes,” which could support his business 
endeavors.
Fortunately for this writer, Morowitz has allowed the use o f the pertinent China files 
relative to the specific years in question. Needless to say, these newly discovered (and 
almost destroyed) records were a treasure trove o f information on ABNC and its dealings 
with China. Further, these primary source materials have not been previously available 
to any scholars.
The next step in this study was to search for other primary sources. In a sense, this 
writer was working somewhat backwards on a timeline. Already in hand were the 
Morowitz archives which will enrich readers about the CGU note’s design, production, 
and shipment to China. Needed was the gathering o f  additional primary source material
■ Bank N ote Reporter, monthly publication (K rause Publications)
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on the CGU notes prior to design and production—in other words, the various fmaneial 
steps taken by the Chinese Government which the notes would support.
Critieal in filling that need were the Edwin Kemmerer papers archived at Princeton 
University. Kemmerer, known as the “money doetor” in world financial circles, led the 
group o f experts to China to assist the government there on various matters o f debt 
reduction, finance, and internal eontrols. It was the Kemmerer group, specifically 
member Arthur Young, who advised China to eollect its customs duties on a gold basis. 
As this idea beeame government policy, the GCU notes were printed to support this new 
monetary unit and its use by China. Accordingly, these records were accessed to show 
the historical relationship with the ABNC archival materials within the mueh larger 
Kemmerer group’s scope o f  work.
Further, in terms o f  primary sources, it was important to attempt to view the CGU 
bank note story through a Sino-centric lens. This attempt was made via a search o f  the 
T.V. Soong private papers at the Hoover Institute o f Stanford University. Regrettably, 
this arehival material focused mainly on the time period o f  World War II and little 
relevant information was found to enrieh this study. However, Soong, as Minister o f 
Finance for China during this period, was a critical player. It was he who moved the 
CGU concept forward to reality and was very involved with the subsequent notes that 
China ordered printed. Also on a positive note, some important CGU eorrespondence was 
found in the Arthur Young papers, also archived at the Hoover Institute.
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Scholarly Works
Numerous historians, diplomats, and economists have studied both China’s feudal and 
modem fiscal systems. In I9 I6 , Charles Denby, a former United States Consul-General 
in China, wrote that China’s public indebtedness had been incurred “almost entirely 
during the past twenty-five years” with almost all o f  it foreign held.^ Denby was also 
cognizant o f the importanee o f the maritime customs revenues as China’s most 
dependable source o f funds. In 1926, Chinese economist Ching-Wei Shou wrote that 
the country’s fiscal history could be simply divided into three main periods; (a) the 
Feudal Period (2698-221 B. C.), (b) the Imperial Period (221 B. C. -  I9 I2  A. D.), and (c) 
the Republican Period. Shou, a beneficiary o f  both Chinese and American educational 
systems, contended that China’s fiscal systems were in need o f modernization within the 
broader context o f social reconstruction. Further, his work pointed out that China should 
not forget the lessons o f its fiscal past, i.e. poor taxation practices and unfair land 
administration. Shou specifically called for a firmly controlled coinage system to 
minimize the scourge o f  inflation seen with many paper notes.
Other scholarship, such as that done separately in 1930 by Julean Arnold^ and 
Dickson Leavens,^ began to appear as the Kemmerer group was finishing up its work in
 ^Charles Denby, “The N ational D ebt o f  C hina -  Its Origin and Its Security,” Annals o f  the American 
Academy o f  Political and Social Science. 68 (1916); 55-70.
Ching-W ei Shou, Democracy and Finance in China: A Study in the D evelopment o f  Fiscal Systems 
and Ideal (N ew  York: Colum bia University Press, 1926).
 ^ Julean A rnold, “The Commercial Problem s o f  China,” A nnals o f  the American Academy o f  Political 
and Social Science. 152 (1930): 142-159.
^ D ickson H. Leavens, “Chinese M oney and B anking,” A nnals o f  the American Academy o f  Political 
and Social Science. 152 (1930): 206-213.
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China. Both noted the complexities o f various forms o f silver being used in China and 
the perils o f trade transactions with silver being a highly fluctuating component. Arnold 
argued that China had become a dumping ground for the world’s surplus silver and was 
thus suffering from impaired trade. Further, he stated that China “has much to gain by an 
arrangement whereby trade will not be harassed by the uncertainties o f a currency which, 
while serving as a medium o f  exchange, is also a commodity subject to the laws o f 
supply and demand, plus manipulations on the part o f those dealing in this commodity.”  ^
He also contended that while reform was possible and badly needed, its success would 
depend upon a strong national government to effectively exercise control over the 
country.
Kemmerer’s proposed reforms were not without criticism within China. As published 
in Pacific Affairs in 1931, Chu Ching-Lai* contended that changes in China’s monetary 
system were “untimely” and likely unsuccessful as there was no practical way to regulate 
the country’s silver market and likewise the world silver situation. While generally 
respectful o f Kemmerer’s thinking and financial experience, he clearly opposed the 
practical changes suggested and their timetable for implementation.
Throughout the 1930’s, reports on Chinese financial matters followed a predictable 
trend. Silver/silver prices were always the primary topic along with the Manchurian
 ^ A rnold, “Com m ercial Problem s o f  China,” 150.
* Ching-Lai Chu, “A Critical Study o f  the K em m erer Report.” Pacific A ffairs. 4 (1931): 210-224, 
translated and reprinted from Eastern M iscellany. Shanghai, August 25, 1930.
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situation. Such reporting is obvious when considering that China went o ff the silver 
standard in November 1935 and began operating on a managed paper currency system.^
In 1954, economist Frank H. H. King published the first important essay on the 
Customs Gold Unit (CGU).'° He mentioned the use o f the CGU notes and their issuance 
by the Central Bank. From an economics standpoint, this study was good because it 
covered the CGU program from its establishment until its demise with the Communist 
takeover o f  China in 1949. He failed to mention the source o f the CGU notes or their 
design and procurement.
More recent scholarship on China’s early twentieth-century economy includes data 
analysis done in 1997 by Loren B randt" and in 1999 by Philip R ichardson." These 
works focus on the various economic sectors which are important in terms o f  discussing 
imports/exports through the treaty-port system in China. Further, aside from analysis o f 
productivity and other factors, their works are important for understanding growing 
international markets as related to China. This writer concurs with Brandt’s conclusion 
that while the opening-up o f  China to foreign trade was driving economic growth, China 
needed to develop new technical and administrative skills. As its labor force was still 85 
percent agrarian, (versus 75 percent for Japan), it would take longer for the non-agrarian 
labor sector to grow, in skill levels and numbers.
’ Leonard T. K. Wu, “C hina’s M onetary Dilem ma,” Far Eastern Survey. 4: 24, (935), 190.
Frank H. H. King, “Essays in C hina’s Recent Monetary H istory, I; The Custom s Gold Unit,” Far 
Eastern Economic Review . 16(1954): 176-178.
" Loren Brandt, “Reflections on C hina’s Late 19'*' and Early 20"' Century Econom y,” China Q uarterly. 
No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic China. (1997): 282-308.
12 Philip Richardson, Economic Change in China: 1800-1950 (Cambridge, 1999).
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Some exception is taken to Richardson’s position on Manchuria and its treaty ports. 
While Japan was indeed responsible for much of M anchuria’s industrialization during its 
occupation, Richardson mentions the “enormous” military, political, and psychological 
costs to China. However, he fails to mention certain economic and budgetary costs to 
China. Specifically, Manchuria’s various ports collected some ten to fifteen percent o f 
all customs revenues (see Appendix: Table 1). Needless to say, loss o f  the Manchurian 
port revenues after 1931 was significant to China’s national budget.
In 2001 William G oetzm ann" and others took a more global view o f  China’s initial 
experiences in the global financial markets. Loan negotiations, for example, played a key 
role not only in establishing protections for foreign investors, but also allowed an opening 
for some with “colonial designs” on China. Railroads and their finance also played a key 
role. Goetzmann’s position is supported by the records o f Sun Fo’s visit to America in 
1928, initially seeking loans to purchase railroad bonds in an effort to take away Japanese 
control o f a particular rail line (see Appendix: Illustration 1). Sun was not successful in 
obtaining such loans. Today, China attracts considerable foreign investment. But 
unburdened by extra-territoriality, sovereignty, and other issues o f  100 years ago, the 
country is in a much better position to control its financial matters. Goetzmann correctly 
points out that today China is still sensitive on these matters and considers them 
internal."
"  W illiam N. Goetzm ann, Andrey Ukhov, and Ning Zhu, “C hina and the W orld Financial M arkets 
1870-1930: M odern Lessons From Historical G lobalization.” Yale International Center For Finance. 
W orking Paper No. 00-62, O ctober 16, 2001.
Consider the present-day efforts o f  the U.S. governm ent to push China to change its monetary policy. 
Such efforts have had little success.
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In 2001 Mu Yang L i" , gave a second global view o f  the Chinese economy with an 
analysis o f public finance within the context o f  what he calls “institutional 
inflexibilities.” Systems in place by imperial edict were lacking in flexibility and 
sophistication to support the needs o f  modern taxation and finance. While some o f his 
budget figures are admittedly estimates, Li shows the rapid growth o f Maritime Customs 
revenues from the mid-1700’s to the early 1890’s. Such revenues were almost twenty- 
five percent o f  the imperial budget and would grow to become the most stable and 
reliable for China.
In 2004 Tony Latter examined aspects o f  three monetary changes in Hong Kong 
during the early to mid-1930s as China struggled with its debts and finances on a silver- 
based currency program ." While he was correct in pointing out China had made no 
move toward a gold-based system as recommended by the Kemmerer Commission, it 
was not accurate to say that the Customs Gold Unit program was “ largely 
inconsequential.” This writing will show that the CGU program was successful, and 
helped China to pay down a large portion o f  foreign debt in a difficult period o f falling 
silver prices.
Mu Yang Li, “Public Finance and Political Order; L essons from China’s Econom ic D evelopm ent in 
the Late N ineteenth Century.” E-A SPAC, Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, electronic journal, February 
2002. Internet: http://m cel.pacificu.edu/easpac/2002/m uyangli.php3.
Tony Latter, “Hong K ong’s Exchange Rate Regim es in the Twentieth Century: The Story o f  Three 
Regime Changes,” Hong Kong Institute For M onetarv Research. W orking Paper No. 17/2004, Septem ber 
2004.
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Organization
Chapter 1 will review China’s external debt as a result o f  the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), a growing debt after the Boxer Rebellion (1900), and the issues o f Lijin  and 
poor internal taxation practices (1853-1928). Chapter II will address the political history 
o f  the Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi and the important role o f Sun Fo in seeking 
American financial assistance for China. Chapter 111 will examine the Kemmerer group 
o f  financial experts and their scope o f work while Chapter IV will discuss their 
investigations and their role in pushing for the development o f the CGU within the 
Chinese Maritime Customs area. Chapter V will give an historical overview o f the 
American Bank Note Company and will then focus on the company’s role in producing 
the CGU notes for China. Chapter VI will look at the aftermath o f  the CGU program, its 
authors, users, and printer. Chapter Vll will conclude this study by assessing a time in 
China’s history during which it faced outside aggression as well as internal strife. Indeed, 
while this period was one o f China’s darkest financially, it sought out, and, in many 
respects put to good use, the advice o f American experts as it fought its way out o f  a 
tremendous foreign debt burden.
10
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CHAPTER 2
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR DEBT 
Prior to 1894 China had little foreign debt. There were some short-term loans made 
to the Chinese Imperial Government, mostly by the largest foreign bank in China -  the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation." These loans had been paid off as they 
became due. Such borrowings, “a few tens o f  millions,” as termed by some Chinese 
officials, had still left China with no dependence on foreign banks or money m arkets."
Soon China was forced to raise its external debt due to losses in war and rebellion. In 
April 1895, the terms o f the Treaty o f Shimonoseki were finalized. China had lost the war 
with Japan and was forced into agreeing to indemnity payments o f 200 million taelsJ^ 
The treaty also essentially made Korea a protectorate o f Japan, ceded Taiwan and the
The H ongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) was the largest and most powerful o f  the 
foreign banks operating in China. It was a depositary bank for various Chinese G overnment funds. It also 
performed amortization and interest services for many Chinese G overnment loans. See Frederic E. Lee, 
Currencv. Banking. And Finance In C hina (W ashington, DC: Departm ent o f  Comm erce, Bureau O f 
Foreign And Domestic Com m erce - Finance And Investment Division, 1926), 91-92, 136, Government 
Printing Office, Trade Prom otion Series - No. 27.
Incoming investments continued to grow as foreign powers took advantage o f  their trade agreements 
and well as their rights o f  extraterritoriality. But China's balance sheet w ould dramatically grow according 
to C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments In China (New York, 1933), 117-119.
The word "lael" is a  Portuguese m odification o f  the Malay lahil, or "weight." In a monetary sense, it 
is used in translation o f  the Chinese w ord Hang or "ounce." Usually, in Shanghai the standard unit o f  
account was 524.93 grains o f  fine silver and accordingly was referred to  as the "Shanghai tael." Another 
ju s t slightly different unit was the "Haikwan" or "Customs" tael. See A lbert Feuerwerker, China's Earlv 
Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-Huai (1844-1916') and M andarin Enterprise (Cambridge, 1958), 255.
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Pescadores “ in perpetuity,” and opened four more treaty ports/" Yet the financial terms 
soon worsened. Russia, France, and Germany intervened and advised Japan not to take 
possession o f  the Liaotung peninsula as had been ceded in the treaty. This intervention 
and subsequent negotiation resulted in a revised indemnity payment o f  231.5 million 
taels?^ China had no other choice but to borrow the money from abroad to pay Japan. 
A consortium o f Russian, French, and German banks became the lenders. Clearly, their 
respective governments were protecting their own political and financial interests.
The first “Japanese Indemnity Loan” was the Chinese Four Percent Gold Loan o f 
1895. This has also been referred to as the Franco-Russian Loan. A syndicate o f  six 
French and four Russian banks made the loan issue. The loan beared interest at four 
percent annually, which was payable in January and July. The loan was amortized over 
thirty-six years, and was due to be paid by 1931
The treaty terms were disastrous for China. A lmost powerless, and negotiating from a position o f  
little strength, the Qing court could do little. The court seemed "paralyzed" as described by Jonathan D. 
Spence, The Search For Modern China (N ew  York, 1999), 220-222.
A ccounting for fractional amounts o f  taels was standard practice in China aecording to Feuerwerker. 
For example, he quotes E. H. Parker who observed, "fractions are often worked out to the hundred- 
millionth part o f  a tael." Parker also wrote; "In 1886 I came across the accounts o f  the 'Grand Alm oner o f  
Peking' who calculated his fractions down to the ten-billionth part o f  a tael for each item." Certainly, in 
calculating foreign debt the payments were not fractionalized to this extent. But internally, it had been a 
practice for a long time.
■■ As Rem er wrote, the Japanese received their paym ent in full. The treaty stipulated that the funds be 
paid over in London to the Japanese governm ent. This was done between 31 O ctober 1895 and 8 May 
1898. The paym ent was in British pounds sterling and came to US $185.3 million.
The term s o f  the loan were very complex. China issued a "general bond" for the loan. But the 
bondholders could be paid in their choice o f  five currencies. Further, bondholders were assured: "The 
service o f  the bonds will take place, at the option o f  the holders, at Paris, Brussels, and Geneva, in francs; at 
Berlin and Frankfurt-on-M ain, in reichmarks; at London, in pounds sterling; at A msterdam, in Netherland 
florins; at St. Petersburg, in gold rubles..." Thus the bondholders were able to  play the currency exchange 
m arkets and w ere able to receive payment in the currency having the highest value at the time. Since the 
Chinese Custom s revenues w ere used to pay bondholders, this put C hina at a  financial disadvantage. 
Custom s was always forced to provide funding for the bonds tw ice yearly in the currency that was most 
expensive for C hina to pay. See Project o f  A Public Credit Rehabilitation Law, Together With A Report on
12
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A second loan related to the same indemnity needs was the Five Percent Sterling 
Loan o f  1896, or the Five Percent Anglo-German loan. A syndicate o f banks led by 
HSBC and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank also arranged this loan, totaling 16 million 
pounds sterling. However, unlike the earlier 1895 loan, this transaction was payable in 
only one currency -  British sterling.^'* There were other restrictions in this loan contract. 
Funding for repayment stipulated that the loan was to be secured by the Imperial 
Maritime Customs revenues, but no additional or future loan could take precedent over it 
once accepted. Essentially, this loan was to be paid -  principal and interest - via priority 
status over any other loan. Further, as noted in Article 7 o f the loan documents, “any 
future loan charge or mortgage charged on the said Customs Revenue shall be made 
subject to this loan and it shall be so expressed in every agreement for any such future 
loan charge or mortgage.” Other clauses noted if  the customs revenues were insufficient 
to service the loan, China was still obligated to pay using other sources o f revenue. A 
final note in this same article stated that “the administration o f the Imperial Maritime 
Customs o f China shall continue as at present constituted, during the currency o f this 
loan.”'^ This was in reference to the fact that the Inspector-General o f the Customs
the N ational D ebt o f  China and the R ehabilitation o f  China's Credit, by Edwin K emmerer, Chairman 
(Shanghai, China; Com m ission o f  Financial Experts, 1929), 6-8.
' ‘'Project o f  A Public Credit Rehabilitation Latv, Together With A Report on the N ational D ebt o f  China 
and the Rehabilitation o f  China's Credit, by Edwin Kemmerer, Chairman (Shanghai, China: Comm ission 
o f  Financial Experts, 1929), 11.
The British bank was clearly dealing from a position o f  strength in writing the loan documents. The 
maritim e customs services were operated by the British and had been since the middle o f  the century. 
A ccordingly, this tightly structured loan placed itself in the front o f  the line for paym ent before all others - 
and, in a position to alw ays be paid via China's m ost dependable revenue source. In the Kemmerer 
Com m ission's supporting reports, they have relied heavily on o ther’s work. See Stanley F. W right, The 
Collection and Disposal o f  the M aritim e and N ative Custom s Revenue since the Revolution o f  1911 
(Shanghai, 1927).
13
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Service was a British subject as was most o f  his managerial staff. Clearly the bank did 
not want this arrangement to change or see the operation under Chinese management.^"
This same Anglo-German group made a second loan to China. Recorded as the 
Imperial Chinese 4 Î4 Percent Gold Loan o f  1898, a specific reference was made to the 
indemnity owed the Japanese government and that the proceeds o f the loan were to be 
used to pay the indemnity. Totaling 16 million pounds sterling, it was also secured by 
maritime customs revenues “subject to previously loans already charged on the security 
thereof and yet redeemed.” As additional security, China was to transfer certain lijin 
funds under the control o f Inspector-General o f  the Maritime Customs in the amount o f 
five million taels yearly.^^ Moreover, if China decided to revise lijin taxes or abolish the 
system countrywide, the additional security for the loan in an equivalent amount had to 
be obtained by substituting “a first charge upon the increase o f Customs revenue 
consequent on such revision.” Lijin was a tax on domestic transit o f  goods and will be 
covered in more detail in a later section.
These three international loans to China were all charged against China’s most 
dependable and best financial security -  the customs revenue. They were regularly
^  Robert Hart served as Inspector-General o f  the Custom s Service from 1863 to 1908. He was largely 
responsible for the organizational structure, procedures, and staffing for the Service. Hart, a native o f  
Northern Ireland and graduate o f  Queen's College in Belfast, was by most accounts a demanding 
taskm aster and extremely autocratic. See A lbert Feuerw erker, The Foreign Establishm ent in China in the 
Earlv Twentieth Centurv. (Ann Arbor, 1976), 116. See also Robert Hart and C hina’s Earlv M odernization: 
His Journals. 1863-1866. ed. Richard J. Smith, John K. Fairbank, and Katherine Bruner (Cambridge, 1991) 
and The I.G. in Peking: Letters o f  Robert Flart. Chinese M aritim e Customs. 1868-1907. ed. John K. 
Fairbank, Katherine Bruner, and Elizabeth Matheson (Cam bridge, 1975).
As Frederic Lee wrote, lijin  was a tax levied against goods in inland transit. It originated in 1853 to 
produce funds for the Q ing governm ent to fight the Taiping Rebellion. A bolishm ent o f  lijin came up in 
discussions often but there was strong opposition from many because it was felt C hina needed every tax 
income possible. W hile Lee referred to lijin  as "internal barrier taxes", other scholars have used the term 
"com mercial transit tax". For example, the latter w as used by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise o f  Modern 
China (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 430.
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serviced and paid except for a brief period in 1911-12, when the revolution caused some 
temporary disruption in China’s financial administration. By April 1912, any arrears o f 
these foreign loans had been paid. The customs revenues were sufficient to meet the 
financial terms o f  the loans.
As for Japan, the indemnity money began to flow and be put to use (see Appendix: 
Table 2). As Li Mu Yang wrote, some 360 million yen were paid to Japan with some 76 
percent o f that sum allocated to the Japanese Army and Navy.^*
Mu Yang Li, "Essays On Public Finance And Economic Development In A Historical Institutional 
Perspective: China, 1840-1911" (Ph.D . dissertation, Stanford University, 2003), 130.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEBT RISES— THE BOXER INDEMNITY 
China’s next financial challenge came in 1901 with the “Final Protocol for the 
Settlement o f the Disturbances o f 1900” signed September 7, 1901. The agreement 
called for China to pay an indemnity o f 450 million Haikwan taels or $334 million in 
U.S. funds for the Boxer Uprising o f 1900. The protocol terms called for the indemnity 
to bear interest at an annual rate o f  four percent, and to amortize over 39 years. Initially, 
interest was to be paid semi-annually and amortization annually. However, in a revised 
agreement o f 1905, payments were to be made monthly. In return, China received a 4 
percent credit per year on “anticipated monthly payments.”""
Payment for the indemnity followed a track similar to that o f  earlier financial 
obligations. Bonds were issued and resources “assigned” as security for the payments to 
be made. First o f all were the “balance o f the revenues o f  the Imperial Maritime 
Customs, after payment o f the interest and amortization o f  previous loans secured on 
these revenues.” "^ Additional funds would include the “proceeds o f the raising to 5
^  Edwin Kemmerer, “Project o f  a Public Credit Rehabilitation Law. Together With a Report on the 
N ational Debt o f  China and the Rehabilitation o f  China's Credit.'''’ (Shanghai, 1929), 22.
Ibid., 23-24.
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percent effective o f the present tariff on maritime imports.”^' Secondary and tertiary 
assigned funds included native customs revenues and salt revenues, but the maritime 
customs were sufficient to provide funding for the indemnity bonds. Indemnity payments 
were made proportionally to the fifteen foreign powers that fought against the Boxers 
(see Appendix: Table 3).^^ While a sizeable sum initially, the Boxer Indemnity 
obligations were gradually lessened for China’s benefit.
Beginning in 1908, the United States Congress took action to remit back to China 
over half the payments due to the U.S. The first remitted payments were used to support 
Chinese students in the United States and to support Tsing-hua University near present- 
day Beijing. Later in 1925, a foundation was set up to administer the remitted funds, 
with ten Chinese and five American trustees. It was a successful venture and benefited a 
variety o f  cultural and educational programs.
Further transformation o f the overall indemnity due to foreign powers took place 
during and after World War 1. In early 1917, China broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany and Austria. Their indemnity payments were stopped by China and ultimately 
cancelled as part o f the peace settlement. Payments to the “Allied Powers” and the U.S. 
were also deferred until 1922. This freed up some funds for domestic loans. Russia later
Exem ptions to the ta riff increase w ere rice, cereals, flour, gold and silver bullion, and coin.
O f the countries owed an indemnity, Russia was entitled to  the most with 28.97136 percent o f  the 
total. G erm any, France, G reat Britain, Japan, and the United States rounded out the next five countries in 
decreasing percentages. The bottom two countries in terms o f  percentage were Sweden and Norway with a 
combined percentage o f  .01396 percent. O ther countries receiving payments were Italy, Belgium, Austria- 
Hungary, The N etherlands, Spain, and Portugal. See Edwin Kemmerer, Proiect o f  a Public Credit 
Rehabilitation Law. Together With a report on the National Debt o f  China and the Rehabilitation o f  China's 
Credit. (Shanghai. 1929), 25.
"  A rthur N . Young, China's Nation-Building Effort (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press o f  Stanford 
University, 1971), 113-115.
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renounced all payments due in 1924. Thus, with various portions o f  the indemnity either 
cancelled, renounced, or remitted, by 1928 the Boxer Indemnity had been reduced from 
$334 million to $128 million.^"*
Since obligations to Boxer Indemnity payments were reduced, China wasted little 
time in borrowing funds and making domestic loans. Such domestic loans were secured 
by cancelled or remitted portions o f  the Boxer indemnity and generally ran at a much 
higher interest rate (six to eight percent) than previous foreign loans. For example, the 
“ 13'’’ Year Eight Per Cent special Treasury Notes o f the Republic o f  China” loan was for 
eight percent. It was issued in 1924 and matured in 1930. This loan was specifically 
secured against the cancelled portion o f obligations to Russia. Another example was the 
“Public Safety Loan o f the 15*'’ Year.” Issued in 1926, its terms were an interest rate o f 
16.8 percent and a maturity date o f  1935.^^
Further, Salt revenue and Native Customs had also been pledged as security to meet 
various external and growing internal loans. Essentially, after 1915 there was little 
unencumbered revenue that China could use to secure new foreign loans. Thus its only
Y oung. China's Nation-Building E ffort. 115.
Seven major domestic loans were drawn against cancelled or remitted indemnity payments. The 6 
Percent Internal Loan o f  the Seventh Y ear o f  the Republic o f  C hina had its amortization payments drawn 
against the cancelled Russian portion o f  the indemnity. However, the interest was still secured by the 5 
percent customs surplus revenues. Most o f  these loans were found by the financial commission to  be 
evidenced by bearer bonds or bearer treasury bonds. O thers, rather than having a long term, were 
essentially a cash advance to  the Chinese Governm ent. This w as clearly the case with Short Term 
Currency Bonds drawn against the German indemnity portion (1928). Overall, these various domestic 
loans totaled some $86,308,134.51 in local Chinese currency. See Kemmerer, Proiect o f  a Public Credit 
R ehabilitation Law. 61.
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choice was to borrow domestically at higher interest rates. These added to the growing
debt burden.
^  "Readjustm ent o f  National and Provincial Finances," The Bankers W eekiv (Shanghai) no. 511 
(A ugust 1927).
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CHAPTER 4
FURTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO FINANCIAL SOLVENCY:
LIJIN AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERNAL TAXATION 
China was making some positive effort to increase government revenues via changes 
in internal taxation and tariff autonomy. The Washington Conference on Chinese 
Customs was concluded in 1922. While the United States wanted further study on the 
issues, China at least had started down the road toward tariff autonomy.
If import and export duties were raised -  actually more than doubled in the case o f 
imports, internal transit taxes such as Mjin would need to be abolished. Importers and 
foreign traders simply would not subject themselves to higher tariffs without some tax 
relief in other areas. Existing forms o f internal taxation were numerous and all had an 
impact on trade and government revenues. Lijin was the best-known system as it was a 
tax levied on all goods in transit throughout China.
The \ijin system was instituted in 1853 to raise revenues for the government in its 
fight for survival against the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). As the rebels conquered 
more territory, it became almost impossible for the Manchu government to collect land 
taxes. Raising the rate o f similar taxes in other provinces was not workable either as it
20
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might have pushed the populace toward supporting the Taipings/^ While it was 
originally intended to be an emergency or temporary tax, \ijin was never abolished/*
Lijin was originally collected on an ad  valorem  basis at various collection points 
termed “barrier stations.” Theoretically, the system had been set up so that a shipment 
would be subject to no more than a five percent ad valorem  rate. However, Joseph 
Jacobs, the American Consul in China, investigated the situation and concluded 
otherwise. He stated that rates could exceed ten to fifteen percent depending upon the 
distance the shipment traveled. An even higher cost was found in Jiangsu province 
where the rate could exceed fifteen to twenty percent.
While the Chinese government recognized such taxation impeded the free movement 
o f  commodities and injured trade, some officials were loathe to give up the system or its 
revenues. As Jacobs stated, “It appears to be a favorite device o f the Chinese officials to 
abolish the name o f a tax, but reinstate it in some other form and then say that it does not 
exist.” '*'* Needless to say, this was a cause o f  numerous disputes.
Lijin  stations numbered in the thousands. Within a single province, a shipment could 
be stopped numerous times. Attempts were made to simplify the system by a levy called 
dong zhuan. In some provinces, this was also referred to as dong shui."^' Ideally, one paid
”  Shou. Democracy And Finance In China. 130-132.
Joseph E. Jacobs, Likin rLiiinI And O ther Form s O f Internal Taxation In C hina. (W ashington, DC: 
Departm ent o f  State, Division o f  Publications, 1925), 1-4, Governm ent Printing Office, Series D, No. 82 
and China, No. 39.
Jacobs, Likin. 2.
Ibid., 4.
"Likin [Lijin] And The Problem O f  Its Abolition," Bankers W eekly. No. 560, (August 1928).
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all the \ijin taxes at the first barrier. A shipment would then be exempt from payment at 
all other barriers within the province as it moved along the countryside.
These intentioned simplifications were less than successful. First, after the initial 
taxes were paid, the shipment still had to be inspected at each subsequent Mjin barrier in 
its path. Second, in addition to the obvious time delay, a fee was usually charged to 
examine the shipment.
Further problems developed. For example, the Chinese who collected the taxes at 
Mjin stations purchased the right to do so. If  taxes were paid at an initial entry point 
under the dong zhuan  system, they felt cheated out o f their right to collect the tax and 
illegally made shippers pay other fees. One can clearly see that this was not a successful 
system.
Production taxes {zhu zhan shui) and consumption taxes {xiao zhang shui) were 
another attempt to replace the Mjin system. While they had some limited success in 
Manchuria, there was little noted elsewhere in the country because these taxes were 
levied in addition to Mjin charges -  not as a replacement for them.
Foreign shippers especially despised \odishui or the destination tax. When a 
shipment reached its destination, this tax was applied in addition the Mjin fees. The 
monies collected on the foreign goods circumvented the Maritime Customs system and 
stayed in the provinces rather than being remitted back to the central government.
In efforts to raise trade volumes and revenues for the central government, there were 
other failed attempts to reform or abolish Mjin. Ren zhuan was used when eompanies pre­
paid all Mjin charges in a single lump sum. Usually, a group o f companies formed an 
association and agreed on payments for a clearly defined time period with the tax
22
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authorities. But unless all the Mjin stations along the route were covered by the 
agreement, shippers could be taxed again. Further, there were no fixed rates o f payment 
established by the central government. Accordingly, the whole system became one o f 
bargaining between the parties with little official oversight or accountability.'*^
Authorized government officials collected the original lijin levies. However, by 1925 
collection rights had been sold to private firms or individuals -  or simply taken over by 
the reigning provincial military leader or warlord. The system was justified by the 
argument that Beijing officials wanted lump sum taxes put into their treasury at the 
beginning o f  each year. This was in contrast to handling the collections themselves and 
having to wait for the revenues until the physical collections had been made.
It is important to understand that by the 1920’s, these collections were the largest 
source o f  revenues for the provinces. Prior to the establishment o f the Republic in 1912, 
all revenues were remitted to Beijing while the central government paid for the provincial 
administrative expenses. But under the first Republican government o f Yuan Shikai, 
military governors controlled the provinces. To support their military structures, they 
appropriated these tax revenues for their own use. This resulted in the tax system 
deteriorating to the point that instead o f remitting any funds to Beijing, the governors 
began to report, but not forward the amounts they collected. According to Jacobs, few 
provinces even reported anything after 1921.'*^
Clearly, China’s Mjin system and other types o f internal taxation were not a 
dependable source o f revenues for the central government. This system hampered free
Jacobs, Likin. 15.
Ibid., 17.
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commerce, was too complex and corrupt, lacked oversight and accountability, and in the 
view o f  diplomatic officials such as Joseph Jacobs, was a chief cause o f  China’s financial 
position by the mid-1920’s. H. B. Morse held a similar view, estimating that for every 
four taels o f  silver legally collected, some 6.50 taels was illegally charged - a sum that 
was roughly 162 per cent over the amount mandated for collection.'*'* In his financial 
study, Shou asserted that “this system o f internal taxation constituted one o f  the most 
important causes o f China’s economic decadence.. .”'*^  There was also the issue o f 
uniformity o f  measurements, or lack thereof. Measurements o f  land for example were 
not consistent throughout the various provinces. Statistician Sidney Klein quoted a 
Nationalist Government study which found 27 different units o f weight, 22 different units 
o f  length, and 23 different units o f land measurement.'*'* Obviously, these myriad internal 
taxes and lack o f uniform measures exemplified the economic challenges facing the 
Nationalist regime.
China had moved financially from having almost no foreign debt in 1890 to massive 
debts by 1928-29. Revenues from the dependable maritime customs were being 
requisitioned to pay numerous foreign obligations with little left over for domestic needs. 
The system o f taxation was corrupt, mismanaged, and a proven obstacle to increased 
trade and commerce.
Before exploring some o f the specific actions taken to remedy the problem, it is 
important to examine the political context. It is also essential when discussing the need
H osea Ballou Morse. The Trade and Administration o f  China (Shanghai. 1921), 122-124.
Shou, Dem ocracy And Finance In C hina. 132.
Sidney Klein, “A N ote on Statistical Techniques in Comm unist China,” American Statistician. 13: 3, 
(1959), 18.
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for financial solvency, to specify the principals involved and the roles they played in 
trying to move China forward.
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CHAPTER 5
CHINA’S POLITICAL UNIFICATION AND 
THE EFFORTS OF SUN FO 
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA), led by Jiang Jieshi, was “officially” given 
the order to mobilize and begin its Northern Expedition on 1 July 1926.'*^ The troops 
started out in Canton and moved swiftly northward. By October, they had reached the 
Yangzi river and the important tricities o f Wuhan. By spring o f  1927, Jiang began 
planning the advance and attack on Shanghai -  the commercial and financial center o f 
China.
The purpose o f this expedition, as sanctioned by the Guomindang (GMD), was to 
unify the country, to fight imperialism, and to end the warlords control o f areas 
throughout China. This was a combined effort o f the GMD and Communists working 
together to move the country forward.'**
The success o f the Northern expedition armies brought growing strength to the 
Chinese labor movement. Many thousands o f workers were organized in Shanghai, and
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China (New York, 1999), 328.
The philosophical or ideological basis for these efforts w ere Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles o f  the 
People - anti-im perialist nationalism , democracy, and socialism. Spence quoted the Guom indang Central 
Executive Comm ittee: "The hardships o f  the w orkers, peasants, merchants and students, and the suffering 
o f  all under the oppressive im perialists and warlords; the peace and unification o f  C hina called for by Sun 
Yat-sen; the gathering o f  the N ational Assembly ruined by Duan Qirui - all demand the elimination o f  Wu 
Peifu and completion o f  national unification."
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with support from the General Labor Union and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a 
general strike was called in February 1927. Shanghai eame to a standstill for two days 
until forees o f a local warlord broke up the strike. Another important unified strike was 
launched on Mareh 21, 1927. This was done to support the advancing Nationalist troops 
who entered the city the next day, and to fight against various warlords.
Jiang had other plans. He distrusted the Communists and the General Labor Union. 
Meetings were held between Jiang and various industrialists, underworld figures, and 
leaders o f Shanghai’s Green Gang. On April 12, 1927, armed men attacked the offices 
and headquarters o f various Shanghai labor unions. Many union members were killed or 
arrested by these paramilitary gang members and soldiers from the NRA. After several 
weeks, the General Labor Union organizations were declared illegal. The labor 
movement in Shanghai suffered a huge setback as most o f its leaders had been killed or 
jailed.'*'*
The GMD was not united. The city o f  Wuhan had been a center o f  an anti-Jiang 
movement. After early 1926, the Nationalist government was divided into two groups -  
one in Wuhan and the other in the city o f  Nanchang. The GMD split into three Central 
Executive Committees: Shanghai, Wuhan, and Nanchang (later moved to Nanjing).^**
The Wuhan faction was not without powerful leaders. Wang Jingwei, one o f the most 
powerful individuals, had served Sun Yat-sen in Japan and Canton and was respectful 
toward the communists and in agreement with some o f their goals initially. A second
Spence, The Search For Modern China.. 330-336.
“  Jeh-Hang Lai, "A Study o f  a Faltering D emocrat: The Life o f  Sun Fo, 1891-1949" (Ph.D. 
dissertation. University o f  Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1976), 71.
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person in a leadership role was Sun Fo (1891-1973)/' the son o f Sun Yat-sen by his first 
wife. The acting foreign minister o f the Wuhan regime was Eugene Chen, another 
confident o f  the late Sun Yat-sen. The Russian advisor to the communists, Michael 
Borodin, also played a critical role.
As a supporter o f the Wuhan regime. Sun Fo became its powerful friend and close 
confident o f Borodin. Further, Sun was “elected Director o f Youth, member o f the 
Presidium o f the Political Council o f the Guomindang, and member o f the Standing 
Committee o f the State Council in the Wuhan Nationalist government.” ^^  Sun defended 
the fact that Wuhan, now communist dominated, was now being viewed as “red.” His 
response at the time was that if China were successful in expelling the imperialists, then it 
was acceptable to be labeled as “reds.””  The regime’s labor movement was working, 
and Sun felt the workers had the right to form unions and fight for their interests. This 
stance put him in opposition to Jiang, who in Shanghai began suppressing any type o f  
labor movement designed to raise the economic stature o f the average Chinese worker.
In an timely interview on this same issue, Borodin stated his own reasons for splitting 
with Jiang who, he felt, had sold out to moneyed interests:
Chiang Kai-shek came under the influence o f the merchant and comprador 
class in Shanghai...got a few million dollars out o f them and agreed to 
hold down labor to maintain the status quo so the greedy compradors
"Sun Fo" is the Cantonese pronunciation. In M andarin Chinese, the pronunciation would be "Sun 
Ke." There are some references and w ebsites that use the latter, but the Cantonese version is better known 
and will be used in this text.
”  Lai, "A Study o f  a Faltering D em ocrat,” 73-74.
"  Ibid., p. 73.
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would continue to wax wealthy. Under the shadow o f the foreign banks, 
those temples o f  finance, Chiang Kai-shek fell, hence so far as the 
revolution is concerned he is doomed.”
Sun Fo’s support o f the Wuhan regime was short-lived. The labor movement had 
grown out o f  control. Factories were closed, landlords deserted their lands, and the 
communist supported radical union members began to confiscate goods o f foreign 
companies without approval. Sun could no longer tolerate the regime’s more radical 
position. But neither could he totally support Jiang and his government in Nanjing. Flis 
advocacy was for a middle-road approach to achieve national unity.^^ Obviously, one can 
see that Sun Fo’s attitude went through a major change. But why so sudden, and over 
such a short period o f time?
Some, including historian Jeh-Hang Lai, have contended that Sun had never fully 
accepted the communist ideology.”  Further, nationalism continued to dominate Sun’s 
thinking. For example, he supported the labor movement, but not the type o f  radical
Borodin wanted the United States to recognize the regime in Wuhan rather than Jiang and the regime 
in Nanjing. W hen pointed out to him that the US already recognizes one governm ent in China and cannot 
recognize each faction as it springs up, Borodin stated that the US is "becoming as imperialistic as Britain 
anyway." He w ent on to  tell M isselwitz that C hina would achieve normalcy and be able to pay its debts. 
See Henry L. M isselwitz in "Borodin Sounds US on Loan to Hankow," N ew  York Tim es. May 7 1927, sec. 
A, p. 1,5.
Sun Fo insisted on a middle road as he could not support Chiang or the communists. As he told 
reporters: " The only thing for us to do is proceed along the road originally designated. Then we shall 
break up the plot o f  the im perialists to  suppress China's revolution by force. Thus we can frustrate the 
attempt o f  the Fascists to  change the direction o f  the revolution. A nd finally, we can avert the Bolshevist 
crisis precipitated by the destructive but non-constructive Comm unists. Economically we must develop our 
natural resources and build a sound national econom ic foundation to  enable the people to progress along 
the path o f  new industries. The benefits will belong to  the people." Sun wrote this as M inister o f 
Comm unications for the Guomindang. See "Sun Yat-Sen's Son D enounces Sovietism," N ew  York T im es. 
July 26, 1927, sec. A, p. 5.
^  Lai, “A Study o f  a Faltering D em ocrat,” 67-68.
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labor activity that created diplomatic problems with foreign pow ers/^ Sun wanted 
unification without any interference from abroad. In at least one newspaper report. Sun 
supported Lai’s thesis with the statement that “both Communism and Fascism must be 
rejected, and that the people must cling to nationalism, constitutionalism, and social 
reform or be swamped in the rising tide o f  militarism.” *^ Clearly, Sun’s mindset was 
aligned to that o f his late father at this time, rather than to either the extreme political 
right or left.
Since the three GMD executive committees in Wuhan, Shanghai, and Nanjing had all 
rejected communism, there was some common ground on which to discuss unifying the 
party and government. Sun Fo was sent from Wuhan as a representative to serve on a 
reunification committee to reorganize the government. These meetings took place in 
September 1927.
As a result o f  these reunification meetings. Sun Fo was appointed Minister o f 
Finance. Since some members o f  the Nanjing faction disliked the incumbent minister T. 
V. Soong. During the struggle between factions in Wuhan and Nanjing, Soong had taken 
actions to restrain Jiang’s influence in the coastal cities. For example, he had ordered 
Shanghai bankers not to subsidize Jiang’s army without his permission.”  Thus, with the 
approval o f the reorganized government. Sun began work in his new position on 
September 20, 1927.
”  Lai, “A Study o f  a Faltering D em ocrat,” 77-79.
"China's Changing Phases," Los Angeles Tim es. Septem ber 18, 1927, sec. B, p. 4.
”  This action was taken clearly before Jiang married Soong's sister Mei-ling. Lai also contends that T. 
V. Soong "would not dare give Sun any trouble." Sun's father. Sun Yat-sen had o f  course married another 
Soong sister - Ching-ling. Lai gives another reason that Sun Fo had "strongly favored the separation o f  the 
Com m unist Party from the G uom indang in W uhan." See Lai, "A Study o f  a Faltering D em ocrat,” 79-81.
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Sun’s task was grim. China’s treasury was essentially empty. No central bank for the 
government o f  China even existed in 1927, although earlier officials had started planning 
for such an institution. Sun continued this planning because he felt a central bank was 
important to China and its effort to gain financial strength. Sun also set up a financial 
inspection bureau designed to control the departments o f taxation, currency, trade 
exchange, and bank inspection and eliminate redundant or overlapping responsibilities. 
Land values and their taxation were placed under review as well. Relative to tax officials 
themselves. Sun established laws for reward and punishm ent. Sun also formed a 
committee to update very old customs regulations. A fresh set o f rules was needed to 
determine the appropriate amount o f  import taxes.
Despite his best efforts. Sun accomplished little during his three-month tenure as 
Minister o f Finance.'*'* His proposed reforms and projects did not move beyond a written 
proposal stage. He was also unsuccessful in raising enough money for Jiang’s military 
purposes.
By late 1927, Jiang wanted to appoint T.V. Soong as Finance Minister. Soong was 
now Jiang’s brother-in-law (his sister Mei-ling had married Jiang), and members o f the 
Soong family moved into the center o f China’s political power structure/** While both 
Sun Fo and T.V. Soong had been educated in America, in fairness, Soong was probably
' "Two Chinese Leaders Quit," Los Angeles T im es. Decem ber 30, 1927, sec. A, p. 5.
61 Suffice it to say that entire books have been written about the Soong family. Edgar Snow referred to 
it as "the Palace Clique" or the "Soong Dynasty". This clique included Jiang Jieshi and his wife Soong 
Mei-ling, their brother-in-law  H.H. Kung who married Madam Jiang’s elder sister, Soong Ai-ling; Sun Fo 
the only son o f  Sun Y at-sen, who was older than his stepm other Soong Ching-ling. Snow w rote, "As far as 
publicly known, no m em ber o f  the Jiang-K ung-Soong family ever filed a personal tax report." As reported 
by Lois W heeler Snow in Edgar Snow's China: A Personal Account o f  the Chinese Revolution Compiled 
from the W ritings o f  Edgar Snow (N ew  York, 1981), 12-13.
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the better qualified and more experienced. Jiang would rely on his brother-in-law for 
many years in the future.
Sun Fo was appointed to the newly created position o f Minister o f  Reconstruction.^" 
However, for several reasons he did not accept this appointment. First, he did not feel the 
country was unified, and, therefore, could not envision reconstruction amid social and 
financial upheaval. Second, the ministry was a new department, poorly funded, with the 
real financial power in China residing with Jiang and T.V. Soong. Third, Jiang was in the 
midst o f calling for a Fourth Plenary Session o f the GM D’s Central Executive 
Committee. Sun and others, such as C. C. Wu and Hu Han-min, took great exception to 
this, as the Party had not yet convened a third session. But Jiang had the power 
politically to do so even though Sun and others felt he did not have the legal authority.
Frustrated by Jiang’s power play. Sun Fo left China along with C.C. Wu and Hu Han- 
min on a trip to Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. They traveled in the 
hopes o f improving China’s diplomatic relations abroad. Leaving Shanghai in late 
January, the trio arrived in Manila on February 6. Reportedly, while in Manila, an 
assassin attempted to kill Wu who was attending a welcome party sponsored by a group
“  O ther appointments announced by Jiang at the same tim e included Dr. C. C. Wu who was named 
special envoy to the United States. His task was to negotiate treaties in W ashington on behalf o f  the 
N anjing governm ent. T. V. Soong w as appointed Finance M inister and Quo Daiji was appointed acting 
M inister o f  Foreign Affairs. See "China Outlook Still Gloomy," Los Angeles Tim es. January 5, 1928, sec. 
A, p. 4.
“  Lai contends that com m ittee mem bers could serve for a one-year term plus the extension o f  one 
additional year. Since Jiang took office as a m em ber on January 1, 1926, Sun and the W uhan faction felt 
his term had legally expired - even considering a one-year extension. Further, the Wuhan Comm ittee had 
revoked Jiang's party membership. These were the "legal" basis’ for protesting Jiang's actions, but in this 
power struggle, Jiang won.
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o f Chinese overseas merchants. Wu was able to escape unharmed. Sun and Hu did not 
attend the event.”
Hu Han-min and Sun Fo, despite traveling in the Middle East, had followers who 
back in China still worked against Jiang and his regime. This group became known as 
the “Reconstruction Clique” and its goal was to “reconstruct” the GMD. One o f their 
objectives was to literally re-register all party members. This re-registration would allow 
them to purge the Communists, pro-Communists, corrupt members, or any other 
undesirables. But since an election standard could not be agreed upon, this goal was 
never reached. The clique was obviously anti-Marxist and anti-leftist. They insisted that 
party doctrine would be soundly based on their interpretation o f  Sun Yat-sen’s “Three 
People’s Principles.”
The group specifically opposed Jiang’s growing power. They felt there should be a 
separation in power between the militarists and party leaders. It was also felt that Jiang 
was weak in dealing with Japan. They sought foreign alliances with Great Britain and the 
U.S. to help restrain Japanese aggression.
Financially, the Reconstruction Clique was very weak. Despite some pro-clique 
newspapers being published, the group gained no solid support within the Party. Jiang
^  Lai referred to a Chinese source book in reporting this assassination attempt. However, this w riter has 
been unable through research to corroborate this event in Manila. He also contends that Sun Fo and Hu 
Han-min did not w ant to attend this event in M anila because the M erchant Association had not hung out the 
new flag — blue sky and w hite sun. Lai stated it was not the M erchant's Association fault on the flag issue. 
Rather, the Chinese Consul-General in Singapore had not yet notified overseas Chinese that they should 
hang the new flag o f  the N ationalist Government. However, on February 9, The Tim es (London) reported 
that an assassination attem pt had occurred in Singapore. The report stated that C.C. Wu was fired at w hile 
leaving Singapore’s C hinese Chamber o f  Comm erce. It was further stated that the unidentified assailant 
was arrested, but that Dr. Lim Boon-keng, form er principal o f  the University o f  Amoy, “was wounded, but 
not dangerously.”
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was simply too strong and dominated the military and Central Party headquarters. The 
Clique, as a political entity, gradually died out by early spring o f  1928.
In June 1928, the trio was in Paris. They learned that Jiang’s army had captured 
Beijing and essentially unified the country. Wu suggested that a proposal be drafted to 
the Nationalist government to put in practice Sun Yat-sen’s “Five-Power System.” In 
simple terms. Sun Yat-sen had visualized a constitutional system with the separation and 
independence o f five powers -  legislative, executive, judicial, examination, and control. 
Sun Fo wrote the draft entitled “An Outline o f  the Principles for Controlling Politics 
during the Period o f  Political Tutelage and the Methods o f  Handling Chinese Foreign 
Policy.””  After some revision, the Nationalist government in Nanjing accepted their 
proposal and moved forward on putting it into effect.
In August 1928, the group split up with Hu returning to China. Sun Fo, however, 
went to the United States (see Appendix: Illustration I). In New York, Sun made 
contracts with firms in the architectural/construction and engineering fields.”  In New 
Jersey, he visited Professor Edwin Kemmerer at Princeton University. Kemmerer was 
invited to come to China to help reform China’s currency and modernize the country’s
Lai, "A Study o f  a Faltering D em ocrat,” 90.
^  Sun Fo awarded contracts to N ew  York architect Henry M urphy to advise the N anjing Government on 
the construction o f  its capital, handle city planning, and erect governm ent buildings. M urphy was involved 
in prior years w ith planning and construction o f  missionary colleges in China. Ernest Goodrich, N ew  York 
engineer, was contracted to deepen the Pearl River in China so ocean-going vessels can sail directly to 
Canton instead o f  having to off-load and trans-ship from Hong Kong. Another unnam ed American concern 
was contracted for flood control work. See "American Help Hope O f China," Los Angeles Tim es. October 
15,1928, sec. A, p. 10.
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economic infrastructure/^ Kemmerer accepted the invitation and Sun arranged for a 
Commission o f Financial Experts, headed by Kemmerer, to come to China/*
W hile the exact sequence o f  m eetings and contacts is unclear, it is known that Sun Fo met with J.P. 
M organ & Co. in N ew  York prior to any meetings with Kemmerer. Fie was seeking funds to purchase 
Russian bonds held against the C hina Eastern Railway. He was unsuccessful as the New York firm was 
already aligned with Japanese railroad interests. See Roberta Dayer, Bankers & Diplom ats in China 1917- 
1925: The A nglo-American Relationship (London. 1981), 238.
“  After initial contacts, the formal invitation to Kemmerer was m ade on O ctober 4, 1928. See Bruce R. 
Dalgaard, "Conditionality and Financial Reform in China: The Kemmerer M ission o f  1929," W aseda 
Journal o f  Asian Studies 20 (1998): 43.
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CHAPTER 6
THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL EXPERTS 
China needed a top financial team -  professional, worldly, and dedicated. Further, 
the team had to be respected in international financial circles. Much was at stake in 
China’s effort to re-align itself economically. The team that traveled to China was well 
equipped with the expertise to get the job done.
Why the Americans? And why Kemmerer? First, America’s presence in China was 
financially at a much lower level in terms o f investment and trade when compared to the 
European powers (see Appendix: Table 4). Further, in the 1920’s, America was clearly 
the world’s strongest economic power in the post-war period. World War 1 had ended 
with America intact and not under reconstruction like much of Europe. The United 
States had sufficient capital to invest. Economist Bruce Dalgaard wrote that if China 
could get a “seal o f approval” from American financial experts that it was putting its 
financial house in order, these experts could help get access to funds from large 
American banks.”  Third, if the American bankers became favorably impressed relative 
to helping fund China, then more private capital would flow there for private enterprise. 
Increased capital inflows would enrich trade and help modernize China.
‘’D algaard, "Conditionality and Financial Reform in C hina,” 44.
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While Kemmerer did not advertise his experience and previous foreign assignments, it 
is probable that his name was mentioned by banking establishments that Sun Fo chose to 
eall on. The firm o f  Dillon Read in particular had a special relationship with the 
American economist. Kemmerer, the “money doctor,” was clearly chosen because o f his 
impressive credentials and past experience in working abroad, and his network o f 
relationships in academia and American financial circles (see Appendix: Illustration 2 
and 5 ) . Kemmerer’s doctoral dissertation was done at Cornell University and was 
published as “Money and Credit Investment in Their Relationship to General Prices.” 
This was an important contribution to the quantity theory o f  money. After some six years 
teaching economics and finance at Cornell, Kemmerer moved to Princeton. In 1918, he 
published the first edition o f  The ABC o f  the Federal Reserve Svstem. This work 
became a standard college text in America and was followed by later editions.™
Kemmerer’s international experience began with an appointment as financial advisor 
to the U.S.-colonial government in the Philippines. His teacher. Professor Jeremiah 
Jenks, had recommended him. In Manila, Kemmerer helped develop a gold-exchange 
standard monetary system. In later years in China, Kemmerer would use aspects o f  his 
Philippine program. Economist Paul Trescott stated the system was intended to permit a 
small open economy to gain the benefits o f stable exchange rates and currency 
convertibility. This could be done without the need to coin gold or maintain a significant 
gold reserve. Kemmerer’s consultancy visit to Mexico in 1917 led to a future series o f 
assignments in various Latin American countries. These included Guatemala (1919,
™ Paul B. Trescott, "The M oney Doctor in China: Edwin Kemmerer's Com m ission o f  Financial 
Experts, 1929," Research in the History o f  Economic Thought and M ethodology 13 (1995): 126.
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1924), Colombia (1923), Chile (1925), Ecuador (1926-1927), and Bolivia (1 9 2 7 )/' He 
also served as eo-ehair o f  the Kemmerer-Vissering commission to South Africa (1924-
1925), as well as a member o f the Dawes Commission on European reparations (1924).™ 
Obviously, Sun Fo felt Kemmerer was uniquely qualified to solve financial problems.
Sun Fo and Kemmerer had begun their discussions in early August 1928 in New York 
City. The initial meeting was followed by cables and other communications with Frank 
Lee, China’s representative in New York. Kemmerer’s agreement to be financial advisor 
to China was outlined in a detailed memorandum to Sun Fo on October 20, 1928.™
With Kemmerer as chairman, the commission o f  experts were to serve the Chinese 
government for one year (including travel time). All work was to be done in China and 
Kemmerer was to give China his full time and efforts during this period. His team was to 
include five experts in various fields o f  finance, two secretaries who were to be trained 
and experienced economists and two assistant secretaries who were “younger men with 
good economic training.”™ Kemmerer was to be directly responsible to the Chinese 
government, while all other commission members and support staff were responsible to 
him.
In addition to duties in heading up the commission, Kemmerer was to devote his time 
primarily to currency and banking problems. The team o f other experts were to include:
Paul B. Trescott, "The M oney D octor in China: Edwin Kemmerer’s Comm ission o f  Financial 
Experts, 1929," Research in the History o f  Economic Thought and M ethodology 13 (1995): 126.
’"Dalgaard, "Conditionality and Financial Reform in C hina,” 44.
”  Edwin Kemmerer, Princeton, to Sun Fo, O ctober 20, 1928, Box 83, Edwin Kemmerer Papers, Seeley 
G. Mudd M anuscript Library, Princeton Uniyersity, Princeton, NJ.
K em m erer to  Sun Fo, O ctober 20, 1928, Box 83, K em m erer Papers.
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(1) an expert in issues/problems o f  taxation who would focus particularly on the 
questions o f  publie revenue and publie expenditure; (2) an expert in the field o f publie 
credit who would devote his attention particularly to issues/questions o f  government 
loans, and o f government loan policy; (3) an expert in accounting and budgetary 
procedure, who would concentrate chiefly on problems o f the budget, accounting and 
fiscal control; (4) an expert in practical banking problems and technique, who would be 
attentive to questions o f  banking organization and operations; and (5) an expert in 
customs administration who would devote his attention chiefly to problems o f  customs 
house organization/*
As for compensation to Kemmerer and his team to serve in China, the memo to Sun 
Fo also detailed amounts and schedules;
The Government o f China will pay to the President o f the Commission 
as full compensation for his services and for the services o f  the five 
experts associated with him and the four secretaries for a period o f  one 
year beginning the date o f leaving New York and ending the date o f 
arriving back in New York (the sum o f  four hundred thousand dollars 
($400,000) United States Currency. One hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000) o f this sum will be paid to the President o f the Commission ten 
days or more before the Commission leaves New York, and the balance o f 
three hundred thousand dollars each ($100,000), one four months after the 
Commission arrives in Shanghai, one eight months after the said date and 
the final one not later than the date on which the Commission sails from
K em m erer to Sun Fo, October 20, 1928, Box 83, K em m erer Papers.
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China on its trip home. These payments will be made to the President o f 
the Commission in United States currency.™
Kemmerer assembled a strong team to serve on the commission. He had “experts” as 
well as “assistant experts,” secretaries, assistant secretaries, and assistants. After the 
commission had formally finished its work in China, all o f  Kemmerer’s experts stayed on 
in China as well as some other team members. While the focus o f this writing is not an 
intensive review o f the commission members, it is appropriate to mention those who 
joined the group in 1929 and later stayed as employees o f  the Chinese government.
The “experts” included Arthur N. Young, age 38. Young was born in Los Angeles, 
California, in 1890. He received his Bachelor o f  Arts degree in 1910 from Occidental 
College. He continued graduate work at Princeton University from 1911 until 1914, 
receiving his MA in 1911 and earning a Ph.D. in 1914. Later, he studied law at George 
Washington University and received his LL.B. degree there.
Young worked as instructor in economics at Princeton University from 1915 to 1917 
and as a research associate o f  the University o f California in 1917. He then began an 
extensive career serving both the American and foreign governments. He was an adviser 
on taxation to the Mexican government in 1918; trade expert o f  War Trade Board o f the 
United States Government in 1918; trade commissioner to investigate financial 
conditions in Spain for the U.S. Department o f  Commerce in 1919; economist in the 
office o f  foreign trade advisor, U.S. Department o f  State, 1919-20; financial advisor to 
the government o f  Honduras, 1920-21; financial expert, U.S. Department o f State, 1921- 
22; economic advisor, U.S. Department o f State, 1922; associate o f American Observer
K em m erer to Sun Fo, O ctober 20, 1928, Box 83, K em m erer Papers.
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with Reparation Commission during the preparation o f  the Dawes Plan in 1924; chairman 
o f the Interdepartmental Committee on Oil Pollution in Washington in 1926. Young 
served as an expert during the foreign debt negotiations o f the United States Government, 
1924-27, and as a delegate to the World Economic Conference in Geneva in 1927.
Young published extensively on foreign finance and trade issues after leaving 
Princeton.^*
Frederick A. Cleveland, age 63, was an attorney. An Illinois native, he received his 
doctorate degree from DePauw University in 1890. After two years o f law study, he 
practiced from 1891 to 1896. From 1898 to 1902, Cleveland was a member o f the 
Committee o f the National Municipal League on Standardization o f Accounting and 
Budgets. The years 1900-06 he spent in academia where he served as Professor o f 
Finance at the University o f Pennsylvania and at New York University. From 1902-07, 
Cleveland returned to the private sector where he served with the firm Flaskins and Sells, 
CPA’s. There he was in charge o f various railroad company and insurance company 
audits. Also during this time, he was hired by the governor o f Kansas to set up a system 
o f  modern accounts for that state. From 1905-10, Cleveland served in the mayor’s office 
o f New York City. Fie headed various commissions on finance and administration with 
an emphasis on municipal accounting systems. Cleveland spent the years 1910-13 in 
United States Government service under President Robert Taft. He chaired the 
President’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency during this time. The later years o f
”  Edwin K em m erer Papers, File: Comm ission M embers, Box 84/85, Seeley G. M udd M anuscript 
Library, Princeton U niversity, Princeton, NJ.
™ Trescott, "The M oney D octor in China,” 127.
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WWI brought a move for him back to the New York area where for example he served as 
Chief o f  Staff for an Inquiry into Methods o f the New York Customs Service. After the 
war, and since 1919, Cleveland worked as Professor o f  United States Citizenship under 
the Maxwell Foundation at Boston University. Prior to accepting the assignment with 
Kemmerer’s group, he had also authored or co-authored several books on civics and 
financial administration.^^
Oliver Lockhart, age 48, graduated from Cornell University in 1908. He then served 
on the faculty at Ohio State University until 1918. He later worked as an economist with 
the National Bank o f  Commerce in New York City 1918-1924, and then returned to 
academia as Chair o f  the Economics Department at the University o f Buffalo. He had 
been a member o f Kemmerer’s missions to Ecuador and Bolivia in 1926-1927.
Benjamin Wallace, age 46, had graduated from the University o f Wisconsin in 1912 
receiving his doctorate in political science. In 1918, he joined the U.S. Tariff 
Commission, becoming in 1921 C hief o f  the Division o f  Preferential Tariffs and 
Commercial Treaties.^*'
William Poland had recently served in Persia as Director General o f Railways. He 
had graduated from the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology and served during World
Cleveland was the author of: "Growth o f  Democracy in the United States" (1898), "Funds and Their 
Uses" (1902), "First Lessons in Finance" (1903, 1923), "The Bank and the Treasury" (1905), Railroad 
Promotion and Capitalization" (1912), "Railroad Finance" (with F.W. Powell, 1913), "Chapters in 
M unicipal A dministration and A ccounting" (1913), "Organized Democracy" (1913), "Democracy and 
Reconstruction" (with Joseph Schafer, 1919), "The Budget and Responsible Government" (with A.E. Buck, 
1920), and "American Citizenship" (1927).
^  Trescott, "The Money Doctor in C hina,” 128.
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War I as Director o f  Relief in France and Belgium. During the 1920’s he worked on a 
study to consolidate the U.S. railroads into seven major systems.*'
William Watson was an Assistant Expert on Kemmerer’s team. Watson, age 47, had 
been assoeiated with the National Institute o f Public Administration and the New York 
Bureau o f Munieipal Researeh since 1917. His specialization was the financial 
administration o f units in state and loeal governments.
These men and the others on the eommission constituted the largest team that 
Kemmerer had ever put together for international work. As a whole, the group, counting 
Kemmerer, was strong in economics. As Paul Trescott noted, six members held Ph.D. 
degrees in economics and finance and four others had similar training.*^ As 
commissioners, the scope o f  their task ahead was unsurpassed. Even with their 
respective international experiences, China, by virtue o f its huge land mass and teeming 
population, would constitute the largest professional ehallenge for each o f  them. This 
chapter is important as some members o f the team stayed on in China and worked for
Poland made a similar study o f  the rail system in China. Accordingly, as a com m ission member and 
expert, he recom mended the Chinese com bine their railways into six operating system s...essentially more 
centralization instead o f  a huge m atrix o f  short fragm ents o f  rail service. See A rthur N . Young, China's 
N ation-Building Effort. 1927-1937 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press o f Stanford University, 1971), 319.
O ther members included John Parke Young, brother o f  A rthur Young. He held a Ph.D. from 
Princeton and had served as staff director for the foreign currency and exchange investigation o f  the U. S. 
Senate in 1923-1925. Since 1926, he had been serving as professor and chair o f  the economics department 
at Occidental College. Fenimore Lynch, age 37, had worked in China with the International Banking 
Corporation. Richard Bonnevalle, age 34, had served in Russia with the American R elief administration 
during the H erbert H oover administration. He later worked for the U.S. Departm ent o f  Commerce until 
1926, when he went to Persia on the same mission as W illiam Poland. Frank Fetter, a Ph.D. graduate under 
Kem m erer, was on the C hina team. He had previously accom panied Kemmerer on his missions to 
Guatem ala, Chile, Poland, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Kemmerer's own son Donald w as on the team. He had 
assisted his father on numerous foreign projects. He was a Princeton graduate. H arry Price, age 23, had 
been born in China to missionary parents and had lived there from birth to age 15. He was a graduate 
student in economics at Princeton. The final mem bers o f  the team included Edward Feely, John M cGregor 
Gibb, W etmore Dawes and George M. Thom pson. See Paul B. Trescott, "The M oney Doctor in China: 
Edwin Kemmerer's Comm ission o f  Financial Experts, 1929," Research in the H istory o f  Economic 
Thought and M ethodology 13 (1995), 129.
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years after their original work was done. Those specific members and contributions 
made in helping China will be explained in later chapters.
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CHAPTER 7
INVESTIGATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
On February 9, 1929, the Commission o f  Financial Experts arrived in China. A few 
days later, Kemmerer met with Sun Fo and T.V. Soong. The goals agreed upon ineluded: 
1) centralize federal control o f China’s finances; 2) establish a uniform currency; 3) 
abolish the tael system; and 4) create a budget and reorganize China’s finances so that 
foreign obligations could be repaid in the shortest possible time.*^
The commission members worked out o f  offices in the Central Bank building in 
Shanghai. Kemmerer formed six sub-committees among his group: currency and 
banking, public credit, railroad finance, taxation, tariff and budget, and accounting and 
fiscal control. The task for each was to prepare a report that all commission members 
would endorse.*'' Further, each report was to include “definite projects o f law.”
D algaard, "Conditionality and Financial Reform in C hina,” 46.
As work o f  the Comm ission progressed Soong put controls in place so that all information relating the 
the Com m ission's w ork w ent through his office: “ 1) In the cases where the M inistry o f  Finance itself, or 
other organization thru the Ministry o f  Finance, request the Com m ission to render opinions or advice, in 
w riting, such opinion or advice, when prepared by the several m em ber’s the Com m ission concerned, and 
approved by the President o f  the Commission, will be sent to the M inister o f  Finance for such further action 
as is necessary. 2) W henever an organization requests that one or several mem bers o f  the commission 
participate in discussions relating to the concerned organization's w ork or problems, the request should be 
approved by the M inistry o f  Finance before it is com plied w ith by the members o f  the Commission. After 
such approval has been given, the members o f  the Com m ission shall be at liberty to participate in such 
discussions. 3) Anything in the nature o f  proposals relating to new  projects o f  law, w hether in tentative or 
final form, shall be subm itted to the National governm ent thru the M inister o f  Finance.” As cited in a letter
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This report was in a format that one would find similar to a legislative bill working its 
way through the U.S. Congress or state level body.*^ Members found China’s financial 
situation in need o f immediate action. Total foreign and domestic debt had reached 
almost US $1.5 billion. O f that amount, about half was debt that was in arrears with 
approximately one third o f the arreared amount constituting unpaid interest. China 
needed to maximize and efficiently control current streams o f revenue. This was not a 
time to creatively promote new kinds o f taxes. This was evidenced by a report on 
revenue policy issued by the commission members:
In developing the revenue side o f financial rehabilitation, the Chinese 
Government cannot now afford to experiment with untried sources o f 
revenue, but should devote careful attention to improvement o f the sources 
it is now using. One o f the principal reasons for this conclusion is the state 
o f  development o f  financial administration in China. Outside the customs 
and salt revenue services, there is little tradition in China o f administrative 
efficiency and control in tax matters, no generally recognized body of 
technical rules o f  procedure, and no satisfactory standards o f performance. 
Furthermore, there is little or no comprehension on the part o f  taxpayers 
that taxes are a contribution to the expense o f maintaining essential public 
services, and all too little evidence o f the recognition o f this truth in
from T. V. Soong, Shanghai, to Edwin Kemmerer, August 5, 1929, Folder: Soong, Box 86, The Edwin 
Kemmerer Papers, Seeley G. M udd M anuscript Library, Princeton U niversity, Princeton, NJ.
Kemmerer liked to use the tactic o f  w riting his reports in legislative format. They could then be voted 
on immediately by the Legislative Yuan in China. I f  drafting legislation was left to the "native politicians", 
the reforms w ould lack substance and not accom plish what needed to be done. Dalgaard wrote that when 
the comm ission gave the governm ent such "ready-made" legislation, the legislature would either pass or 
defeat the proposal rather than pick it apart in some committee.
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practical ways by public servants themselves. This is an historical 
situation, the statement o f  which implies neither praise nor blame.*®
Clearly the commission was trying to be realistic. The members realized that the 
financial traditions o f  China could not be changed overnight. The concept o f 
contributions for the common good ran counter to forced taxation, which historically had 
often personally enriched officials.
The eommission members looked to the Maritime Customs revenues as a baseline 
source o f funds to enable China to keep its commitments and repay debt. In the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1929, customs revenues equaled 53.5 percent o f  total government 
expenditures and 73.4 percent o f  non-borrowed revenue.*^ Import and export duties were 
91 percent o f all customs revenue that year. Obviously, the customs revenues and tariff 
structure were being given a thorough review by the commission, but a major financial 
burden remained. China collected its revenues in silver but was required to pay its foreign 
debts in gold. At the time o f the commission’s work, annual payments in terms o f gold 
currencies were equivalent to about US $40 million.** Silver was fluctuating wildly 
worldwide in 1929 versus a much less volatile price o f gold. To put China on a pure gold 
standard would have required at least some gold coinage and also certain reserves would 
have to be kept in gold bullion. China was operating on a silver standard, or as 
economist Trescott wrote, a “combination o f  silver standards.” There were silver coins.
Edwin Kemmerer, “Report on Revenue Policy,” (Shanghai: Chairman - Com m ission o f  Financial 
Experts, 1929), 1.
Dalgaard, "Conditionality and Financial Reform  in China,” 48.
Edwin Kemmerer, “Project o f  Law for Placing Custom s Duties on Imports From Abroad Upon a Gold 
B asis,” (Shanghai: Chairm an - Comm ission o f  Financial Experts, 1929), 2.
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silver “dollars,” the Shanghai taels, the Haikwan taels, and numerous other 
denominations or bars relative to silver. Needless to say, this was a complex situation for 
matters o f currency and payments.
The solution was not to move China to a gold basis, but to place the country on a 
gold-exchange or gold-equivalent basis. The proposal put forth was to create a new 
currency called the “Sun” (after Sun Yat-sen). This new “Sun” would have a gold value 
o f approximately US $.40. Its value would be maintained by its convertibility into gold 
bars or gold-denominated foreign exchange. This proposal would also somewhat 
stabilize the foreign exchange rate with countries on a gold standard.
Due to the falling price o f silver, the cost to China to service foreign debt began rising 
monthly in 1929. Annual payments government debt payments were some US 
$20,000,000 for foreign loans, US $18,000,000 for Boxer Indemnity payments, and the 
Crisp Loan, secured on the Salt revenue, o f about $1,500,000 yearly. Monthly, this 
averaged some $3,300,000.*^ On average, the cost to China monthly in 1928 was 
$7,070,000 (local currency) versus a cost o f $7,930,000 (local currency) by May 25, 1929 
(see appendix; Tables 5-8). Thus, urgent action was needed to provide relief on the 
revenue side. Accordingly, this troublesome financial issue was one o f the first 
Kemmerer conveyed to T. V. Soong.
** Edwin K em m erer and A rthur Young, "Injury To Governm ent Finances By Reason O f The 
Depreciation o f  Silver," (Shanghai; The Com m ission o f  Financial Experts, 1929, typewritten). Box 31, The 
Arthur Y oung Papers, The H oover Institution o f  War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 
Stanford, CA.
^  Edwin K em m erer to  T. V. Soong, May 27, 1929, Box 31, Young Papers.
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Discussions continued back and forth on this matter as the archival record clearly 
shows. On issue in particular needed to be addressed - to convince Soong that the plans 
were workable. While Soong understood in economic terms the need for action, could 
the plans functionally be handled by the Maritime Customs Administration? While any 
problems would be mitigated by the fact such changes would affect import duties only, 
there remained a need for consensus to make sure the system was practicable.
Kemmerer and Young took the initiative and sought assurances from the Customs 
Administration that their ideas were workably sound. In consultations with Mr. F. Chang 
o f the Guan Wu Shu (National Tariff Commission), the Customs position on this was 
outlined.^' Customs duties were being calculated in Flaikwan taels. As Chang stated, 
while this was a fictitious money o f account, it carried a fixed ratio to the Shanghai iael, 
which was the standard silver currency used in the trade o f Shanghai. I f  the 
Kemmerer/Young plan was implemented, the Haikwan Xael would no longer be used. It 
would be replaced by the new gold money o f  account -  the “sun” ( or later the CGU).
The “sun” would bear a fixed ratio to the American gold dollar or the British pound 
sterling, but would have a fluctuating exchange rate with silver. The main difference 
would be that the former conversion rate from Haikwan iael to Shanghai tael was 
constant; the new plan would call for the conversion rate to become variable as the price 
o f gold dollars and other currencies floated on the world financial market.
Further, Chang stated that relative to articles subject to specific duties, it would be a 
rather easy process to adopt a gold money o f  account for the purpose o f  duty calculation.
F. Chang -  National T ariff Com m ission, Shanghai to Edwin Kemmerer, Shanghai, Septem ber 24, 
1929, Box 31, The Arthur Young Papers.
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Articles subject to ad  valorem duties were a bit o f  a challenge and more complex. The 
Customs practice had been to base the duty paying value o f  articles on which an ad  
valorem duty “ is levied upon the wholesale market value o f the goods in local currency at 
the port o f  importation.”*'” But in citing data from his internal staff in Shanghai, Chang 
reported that most purchase contracts for imported goods were already quoted in terms of 
gold -  the pound sterling or American dollar. Such contracts and their associated 
invoices were seldom expressed in terms o f  “local currency.” Thus in terms of 
workability, Chan’s view was that the suggested plans o f Kemmerer and Young were 
positive. The only changes needed were to revise certain Import Tariff Provisional Rules 
to delete the phrase “ in local currency” from transactional procedures.^^
Commission member Arthur Young continued to call for prompt action to place 
import customs duties on a gold basis. He reiterated his sense o f  urgency in a memo to T. 
V. Soong dated January 6, 1930 declaring: “Government finances should be divorced 
from dependence upon silver exchange. This will give sound foundation, in place o f  the 
present unsound situation.” '^' This was done even though the move to standardize all o f 
China’s currency to a gold basis was still being discussed. While formally proposed in
^  F. Chang -  N ational T ariff Comm ission, Shanghai to Edwin Kem m erer, Shanghai, Septem ber 24,
1929, Box 31, The Arthur Y oung Papers.
”  K em m erer actually w rote a draft for changes in Import T ariff Provisions Rule 1 to read as follows: 
“the duty-paying value o f  any import liable to an ad valorem rate o f  duty shall be determ ined on the basis 
o f  the wholesale m arket value o f  the goods at the port o f  importation. This value shall be converted from 
other currencies into gold suns at official rates fixed for this purpose. The value in suns shall be considered 
to be higher than the duty paying value by -  (a) The amount o f  the duty on the goods, and (b) 7 per cent o f  
the duty paying value o f  the goods.” See memo - Kemmerer to  T. V. Soong -  M inister o f  Finance, October 
7, 1929, titled “M em orandum  supplem enting the M em orandum o f  May 25, 1929 entitled ‘Injury to 
G overnment Finances by reason o f  the D epreciation o f  Silver.’ " Box 31, Arthur Y oung Papers.
Y oung to Soong, January 6, 1930, Box 30, Young Papers.
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May o f  1929 by Kemmerer and Young, final adoption by the Chinese government took 
plaee on January 15, 1930.^® China would move forward in improving customs revenues 
and initiate the use o f  the customs gold unit. The Project o f Law as adopted was simple, 
o f  short length, and composed o f  three articles.
Article 1 assessed all duties on imports in terms o f the new “Sun” which was 
equivalent to 60.1866 centigrams o f  gold US $.40. The law also established a value in 
British pounds sterling and Japanese (see Appendix: Table 9). Article 2 stated that 
duties on imports then assessed in Haikwan taels would be converted at a value o f one 
and seventy-five hundredths suns (Haikwan Tl.OO = S I.75). This helped make the shift 
from duties assessed in silver to a value linked to gold.^® The final article recognized that 
such duties were not paid in a gold-standard currency. Accordingly, until such time that 
payments were required in gold, customs houses were still required to accept payments in 
silver dollars, silver taels, or other currencies that were in circulation. The “other 
currencies” varied depending on the locality. But all monies were received at the new 
“sun” rate which was an official rate set by the government. The official rate was “based 
upon and shall conform as nearly as practicable to market rates o f exchange between the
In the period I9 2 I-I9 2 8 , the price o f  silver did not vary greatly with a Chinese silver dollar valued at 
about US $.50-.48 However, in 1929 silver prices began to fall w hich reached a low o f  about US $.20 in 
I9 3 I . W hile C hina had gained some ta riff autonom y, the gains were being wiped out by the ta riff rates set 
in sums o f  silver Haikwan taels per unit o f  goods im ported. Young outlined the remedy in his own later 
work. See C hina’s Nation-Building Effort. I927-I937  (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press o f  Stanford 
University, I9 7 I), 45-46.
^  Edwin Kemmerer, “Project o f  Law for Placing Custom s Duties on Imports from Abroad Upon a Gold 
Basis,” (Shanghai: Comm ission o f  Financial Experts, 1929).
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respective currencies and gold-standard currencies.” ’^ Lastly, at least three days public 
notice had to be given for any change in official rates.
This project for converting payments in taels to the new suns was independent o f any 
change in import duty rates themselves. The aim o f the project was positive - to stabilize 
the payments o f import duties in terms o f  gold. At the time o f implementation and on the 
basis o f a depreciated silver value, this meant an increase in payment amounts for 
importers o f about fourteen per cent.
At the plan’s implementation, Soong made some public comments via the official 
government news agency: “This measure is necessary in order to safeguard the 
Government finances. The gold payments made by the government are over nine million 
pounds sterling yearly. The cost o f  meeting these payments in national currency at 
current rates o f  exchange is sixty per cent greater than the average rate o f  1925, and over 
twenty per cent greater than at the rates o f a year ago .. .the new order should have no 
appreciable effect upon trade.”®* He went on to say that the plan would restore import 
tariff duties to the same proportion o f  dutiable rate at the time o f  their origin. 
Accordingly, the Commissioner o f  Customs, W. R. Meyers, began to formally make 
notifications in the press relative to the new law and its implementation (see Appendix: 
Documents 1-7)
Public response to the new law varied over the next several weeks, but was mostly 
positive. The New China Dailv News was generally informational but reported the law
Ibid., 1.
' “Custon 
A rthur Y oung Papers.
^ m s Im port duties to Be On Gold Basis” , Kuo Min N ew s A gency. January 15, 1930, Box 31,
52
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
as a “scheme” originally invented by Sir Robert Hart, the former Inspector-General o f the 
Maritime Customs. While taking a cautious stance on the new law pending it full 
application throughout China, the paper acknowledged the country’s foreign debt 
obligations which had to be paid in gold currencies.®® Another periodical. The China 
Critic, was more positive if  not glowing, calling the government action “a most important 
measure o f  financial reform.” While unclear if  this newspaper was government- 
backed, its articles support a pro-business, pro-modernization stance.
In the United States, the American Asiatic Association responded to China’s move 
stating that “to place foreign import tariffs on a gold basis was serious blow directed at 
silver as a medium o f exchange.” '®' However, the short article went on to acquiesce a bit 
on the issue and state that China’s move would prove to be sound, help build up their 
gold reserves, and help pay o ff the Chinese national debt. Another financial writer in 
New York essentially concurred with the other opinions previously noted. With silver 
reaching a new low record o f  43 cents per ounce, China, it was stated, was “intelligently 
meeting a difficult emergency.” Moreover, the financial situation in China was 
impacting the entire Far East and would ultimately be felt in the United States.'®’
^  “The N ew  Import Duty Scale and N ew  Custom s Explained,” 12, New C hina Dailv News (Shanghai), 
January 18, 1930, Box 31, A rthur Y oung Papers.
The article went on to  s a y ...’’W hen all other nations use gold, China cannot possibly prevent the 
steady fall in silver. The only thing she can do is to make the fall gradual by rem oving as far as possible 
causes for violent fluctuations - in  other words, by stabilizing exchange...th is m easure is beneficial to both 
the governm ent and the people and we congratulate the authorities for taking this mom entous step.” See 
The China Critic (Shanghai), January 23, 1930.
United Press International. N ew  York, January 17, 1930.
George E. Anderson, “C hina’s N ew  Gold U nit,” B arron’s Financial W eekly. February, 17, 1930.
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Japanese government offieials initially had issues. The Ministry o f Finanee offiee 
wished to study matters further and worried about the effeet o f trade between China and 
Japan. Further, should Japan file a formal protest with the Nationalist Government or 
not? The belief was that Japan would have to pay more import duties as a result o f  the 
new law, but that speeulation would diminish as it had been caused by the fluctuations o f 
silver. As for China’s basis for ealeulating the new gold unit exehange rate, Japan felt it 
was “unreasonable” and mueh preferred a rate adopted from a full year o f fmaneial data 
rather than the three month time period China was using for exchange rates. While a 
final “attitude” on these issues had not yet been deeided, Japan’s Ministry o f Finanee 
spokesman also aeknowledged that customs import duties were held to secure China’s 
foreign debt. I f  silver continued to slump, the artiele stated, such payment o f debts may 
be unlikely, thus forcing foreign eountries to aeeept China’s new system.’®’
In order to facilitate the new law and provide tangible support, China arranged for the 
design and production o f  Customs Gold Unit (CGU) paper notes. Bank aecounts were 
arranged in the CGU system by China’s Central Bank for firms doing international trade. 
Further, the eentral bank developed correspondent banking relationships overseas. This 
helped maintain the CGU effeetively “at its gold parity.” '®'' China turned to an American 
printer as this process moved forward.
Japan’s position was quoted from the O saka M ainichi o f  January 29, 1930 and reprinted by the New 
China Dailv N ew s. February 7, 1930.
Trescott, "The M oney Doctor in China,” 134.
54
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
C H A P T E R  8
THE AMERICAN BANK NOTE COMPANY 
The Ameriean Bank Note Company (ABNC) was contaeted to produce the new CGU 
notes. ABNC already had a long history in China. As early as 1913, ABNC was printing 
bank notes for the Bank o f Communications.'®’ This chapter will review ABNC’s long 
history and its important involvement in the CGU program. Specifieally, readers will be 
informed o f the specifies o f the CGU notes and the challenges for ABNC to not only 
provide the product, but also do so in competition with other printers. Mueh o f  this story 
has not been told before, as the archival material was not known to exist, or was not 
available to scholars.
ABNC was a company that traced its roots back to 1795 and a Philadelphia printer 
named Robert Scot.'®® In this year, America was at the midpoint o f the first decade o f its 
constitution. The economy was expanding in this time o f more orderly political 
conditions which resulted in the need for circulating bank notes. This need led to the 
development o f the bank note printing industry.
Brian M atravers and W ard D. Smith, Chinese Banknotes (M enlo Park: Shirjieh Publishers, 1970), 
21-23.
W illiam H. Griffiths, The Story o f  American Bank N ote Company (New York: American Bank Note 
Company, 1959), 15.
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Prior to the adoption o f the U.S. Constitution, engraved notes were in circulation, but 
not via a government agency. A specific example were notes issued by Philadelphia’s 
Bank o f North America. The provincial Congress gave this bank its charter under the 
Articles o f Confederation. After the U.S. Constitution was ratified and supereeded the 
articles in 1789, this bank was given a Pennslyvania charter.’®’
Some two years later in 1791, the Federal government chartered the Bank o f the 
United States. It was headquartered in Philadelphia, with branches in other cities as well. 
A mint was established soon afterward and Robert Scot (1744-1823) was appointed its 
first engraver.'®* In later years, Scot also began an association with Jacob Perkins (1766- 
1849). Perkins greatly advanced the art o f  engraving and platemaking by using steel 
instead o f copper for the engraved surfaces. Further, he developed methods to reproduce 
additional steel plates from an original. With Perkins’ expertise, Scot formed a small 
talented group o f  engravers with innovative printing methods. This formed the “nucleus” 
o f what later became the American Bank Note Company. In 1810, these associates o f 
Scot formed the company Murray, Draper, Fairman & Co (see Appendix: Table 10- 
11).'°® This firm has been remembered for two significant contributions to the engraved 
printing industry: (1) it established the value o f combining arts and techniques as a safety
Griffiths, The Story o f  American Bank N ote  Com pany. 19.
Am erican Bank Note Company, (n.d.). Internet, Retrieyed June 10, 2006 from 
www.scripophily.net/am erbanknote.htm l.
Patrick Harris, Editor. “Financial H istory” (1995). Internet, Retrieyed May 10, 2006, from 
http://www.financialhistory.org/fh/1995/53-l h tm .
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(anti-counterfeiting) measure; and (2) it established world supremacy o f American 
methods."®
Eighteen twenty-three was another significant year as more innovations enriched the 
metal engraving profession. This was an important period which culminated thirty-five 
years later in the formation o f the Ameriean Bank Note Com pany.'" Much recognition 
has been given to two brothers, Cyrus and Asher Durand, for their creativity and 
inventiveness.
Cyrus Durand (1787-1868) is credited with improving or inventing the tools o f  the 
trade for producing engraved printing plates. Extremely talented, he focused on the work 
o f bank note engraving as a profession some time in 1815. He invented a machine for 
drawing straight and wave lines for bank notes. He is also credited with inventing a 
machine for drawing waterlines and various geometric lathes for drawing ovals and other 
shapes on banknotes. Cyrus Durand practiced his craft over a long career and worked for 
American Bank Note for many years after it formation in 1858."’ Asher Brown Durand 
( 1796-1886) was much more o f a creative artist. He was the first to popularize Greek 
gods and goddesses in small vignettes on bank notes and documents. The importance is 
that such vignettes are very hard to copy and timeless to the point that they could be used 
for decades on bank notes, bonds, and stock certificates."’
G riffiths, The Story o f  American Bank N ote Company. 26.
Ibid., 27.
Internet, Retrieyed M ay 10, 2006 from http://wvyw.fam ousam ericans.net/cvrusdurand/
W hile Cyrus Durand was a mechanical genius, Asher w as a true artist. Some o f  his most famous 
engravings included the "Declaration o f  Independence" from a painting by John Trumbull. His engravings 
o f  "M usidora" and "General Jackson" are also well known. In addition to numerous portrait engravings, 
A sher also becam e a talented landscape artist and was a founder o f  the National Academy o f  Design.
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An ABNC predecessor company also started the production o f U.S. postage stamps 
during this period. Another predecessor company worked with numerous colors and 
established the color green as the “money color.”
The formal creation o f the Ameriean Bank Note Company took plaee in 1858 and 
was well received by banks and predecessor companies’ clients. A larger and stronger 
company (internally referred to as “The Association”), meant stability for users o f high 
value documents. Seven firms constituted the “Association” with varying numbers o f 
shares o f ownership (see Appendix: Table 11).
ABNC thrived during the years o f  the American Civil War. The National Bank Act 
was passed in 1863, which required that locally issued bank notes were “supereeded by 
notes made under federal control and direction.” ’"  Accordingly, ABNC produced 
millions o f bank notes each year. Company business levels were further enriched by 
America’s industrial expansion in the post-war years. With that expansion came a rise in 
the use o f engraved certificates for securities."’ Postage stamps remained in production 
as well.
Internationally, ABNC expanded too. The company had built a good reputation and 
it began to receive orders from various foreign governments. These included Argentina,
Internet, Retrieved June 14, 2006 from http ://w w w .fm ancialhistorv.org/fh/l995/53-l.
ABNC was particularly fortunate relative to  the production o f  stock and bond certificates. In a policy 
which was adopted Decem ber 23, 1874, the N ew  Y ork Stock Exchange Comm ittee on Securities made the 
follow ing recom m endation; "The numerous frauds practiced upon the com m unity, in the Counterfeiting o f  
Certificates o f  Stocks and Bonds, and the altering o f  Certificates from sm aller to larger denominations, 
have compelled the Stock Exchange to use all precautions in their power against them , and to require in all 
future applications to place Securities on the List, that they shall be carefully engraved by som e responsible 
Bank N ote Engraving Company." Clearly, ABNC was in a strong position to  help companies comply with 
this new policy as cited in W illiam H. G riffiths. The Story o f  American Bank N ote Com panv (New York: 
American Bank N ote Company, 1959), 46.
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Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Peru, Uruguay, and some British territories. 
Orders were placed for currencies and, on occasion, stamps and bonds."®
A further consolidation o f  the company occurred in 1879. ABNC became larger 
with the assets o f the National Bank Note Company, Continental Bank Note Company, 
and several other firms. Also joining was the British firm Bradbury, Wilkinson & 
Company, L td ." ’ The latter was a wise purchase for ABNC as it complemented their 
efforts for worldwide expansion."*
The year 1891 is very significant for the company as it marked the beginning o f the 
use o f  ABNC’s “planchette paper.” This special paper was developed for bank notes and 
specifically to thwart counterfeiting. The primary supplier o f specialty papers to the 
company was Crane & Company o f Massachusetts. Crane had developed a technique for 
incorporating silk fibers into paper. Domestically, Crane’s biggest customer was the 
Untied States Bureau o f Engraving and Printing which used the silk fiber paper for 
currency.
Since ABNC was not allowed by law to use the same paper the government used for 
printing currency, an innovation was needed that was unique and also served to deter 
counterfeiting. The solution was to design and implement the use o f  planchettes. These
W illiam H. Griffiths. The Story o f  American Bank N ote Company (New York: American Bank Note 
Company, 1959), 44.
O ther firms as part o f  the consolidation included the W estern Bank N ote Com pany, the International 
Bank N ote Company, and the Franklin Lee Bank N ote Company. Franklin Lee was a result o f  another 
m erger betw een the Franklin Bank N o te  Company and the Hom er Lee Bank N ote Com pany as cited in 
W illiam H. Griffiths, The Story o f  American Bank N ote Com pany (New York: American Bank Note 
Com pany, 1959), 31.
Henry Bradbury came from a printing family. He studied engraving in Austria and wrote books on 
the subject. Sadly, he took his own life on Septem ber 2, 1860. He was 29 years old and already judged 
by many to be an artistic genius.
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were small paper discs, with a diameter just smaller than a match head, that were embed­
ded into the paper used to print money. The planchettes were made o f various colors and 
types in an ABNC facility and then shipped to Crane & Co. to be embedded in the final 
production paper."®
While not part o f  a direct ABNC effort in China, it is important to note the work o f 
other Americans there who either had worked directly for the company or another 
corporate entity that was taken over during the consolidation period.
In 1908, a representative from China, Chen Jindao, was sent to visit the United States, 
Great Britain, France and Germany. His job  was to investigate and determine which style 
o f postage stamp production was best suited for China. He also tried to determine what 
styles and methods were least susceptible to counterfeiting. Based on Chen’s work, the 
Chinese Imperial government decided that the American methods for manufacturing 
would work best for their needs."®
The Imperial government asked two Americans, Lorenzo J. Hatch and William A. 
Grant, to come to China and establish a Chinese Bureau o f Engraving and Printing. 
Lorenzo James Hatch (1857-1914), a Vermont native, had established himself as a 
talented artist and engraver. His experience included more than fifteen years work at the 
United States Bureau o f  Engraving and Printing. Fie also worked at both the Western
Griffiths. The Story o f  American Bank N ote Com pany. 53.
Sanghmitra Kundu, "Chinese Die Proofs," EnRoute, 7: 1 (January-M arch 1998). The Smithsonian 
National Postal M useum.
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Banknote Company o f Chicago and the International Bank Note C om pany."' Hatch 
signed a six-year employee agreement with the Chinese government.
William A. Grant (1868-1954) was born in the Bronx, New York City. He studied art 
and engraving and by the time China sought his talents, he was head o f the engraving 
room at ABNC. Grant was an expert in creating lettering, script, vignettes, scrolls, and 
twirls that filled the backgrounds o f bank notes.'”  He supervised similar work in China.
Back in Shanghai, a primary company representative for ABNC was H. F. Payne. In 
an initial 1930 correspondence to the New York office, he outlined the CGU project as 
conveyed to him by T. V. Soong’s office:
We are enclosing with this, material for the preparation o f  models for 
some “Custom’s Unit” notes -  to all intents and purposes a Gold currency 
note, and while this can take its regular course, we would, at the request o f 
the Minister o f Finance, like to have this kept as confidential as you 
possibly can. These notes are to be used as the entering wedge in putting 
China on a gold basis and there is at present a difference o f opinion as to 
how fast the general public will take to using them for purposes other than 
paying Custom’s duties. Some o f the Chinese officials and all the 
members o f the Kammerer [sic] Commission remaining here predict their
Askart - The American Artists B luebook, "Lorenzo James Hatch," 
h ttp ://w w w .askart.eom /askart/h /lorenzojam es_hatch/iorenzojam es_hatch .aspx/ Internet, Retrieved May 
10, 2006.
University O f New Hampshire Library - M ilne Special Collections and Archives, "Grant 
Stereoscopic Slides o f  China: 1908-1915," http://w ww .izaak.unh.edu/specoll/m ancoll/grantsld.htm . 
Internet, Retrieved May 1, 2006.
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general use in large quantities but the Minister o f Finance is not quite so 
optimistic and has vetoed the placing o f a very large initial order.'”
Soong was cautious about an initial order for the notes. He was being careful not to 
over-order a print run which could be costly .'”  As for a design, a vignette o f  Sun Yat- 
sen and one also o f the Shanghai Customs House was requested. The size o f the notes, 
colors, and other aspects o f the design were noted. For example, the design was to 
include the year “ 1930” printed in English, while the Chinese language would be used for 
“Minguo (republic) the 19* year” on the note (1911 + 19 = 1930). One may wonder how 
ABNC insured accuracy in printing Chinese language on bank notes. In this situation, 
the company submitted a request to the Chinese Consul for assistance in producing the 
correct Chinese writing. This was received from the Consul and handed over to the 
ANBC engravers to proceed with their w ork .'”  The engraving department had also 
received a photograph o f the Customs House in Shanghai to work from -  courtesy o f the 
China agent, H.F. Payne.'”  Accordingly, work began on the model notes for approval 
by T.V. Soong.'”
H. F. Payne, Shanghai, China, to G. W. Com bs, February 20, 1930, M orowitz Archives o f  American 
Bank N ote Company, N ew  York, NY.
The Payne m em orandum  outlined the initial order as: 10 million notes (10 cent note denom.), 5 
million notes (20 cent note denom.), 5 million (1 GCU), 1 million (5 GCU), and 200,000 (10 CGU).
D. E. Woodhull, N ew  York, to H. F. Payne, March 6, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
G. W. Combs, N ew  York, to  H.R. Treadw ell, March 7, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
ANBC initiated "Schedule No. 17424" for the CGU model notes. This tw o-page schedule was used 
by the company for all o f  its model notes. It w as highly detailed, denoting precisely w hat was to be printed 
on the front and back o f  the note. Revisions w ere comm on and the archival record has copious amounts o f  
"change orders."
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The process also began in New York to determine pricing o f the CGU notes. What 
would be the cost o f printing to the Central Bank o f  China? And, would Soong and his 
assistant Jian Chen competitively bid the job out to other printers? The record suggests 
that ANBC’s Far Eastern Department Manager, G. W. Combs, was prepared to lower 
prices in order to secure the business. For example, on his bid sheet he quoted a price o f 
$9.00 per thousand notes for printing o f the 10 million (10 cent) CGU notes. But he also 
added the notation “or as low as $8.25.” This secondary pricing was also done for some 
o f the other denominations."* Clearly, Combs did not take anything for granted.
The ANBC engraving department soon finished its work on the CGU model notes. 
The notes were forwarded to the shipper and left the United States for Shanghai via the 
S.S. President Pierce."® Payne was happy to receive this news. He knew ANBC was 
faced with stiff competition for the Central Bank’s business. But he also felt that his 
company had an advantage, which he expressed in his response:
They are most anxious to see the models for the C. G. U. notes and the 
fact that we have the jum p on our competitors in the way o f  having the 
vignette o f  the Custom’s House on the way, is perhaps about all that will 
get the order for us, for naturally our rivals are out strong for the Central 
Bank’s business, particularly since the report o f  the Kammerer [sic] 
Commission was published advocating only one bank o f issue for China.
A NBC, Far Eastern D epartm ent, Request For Estim ate dated March 31, 1930. Subject: Custom Gold 
Unit Notes. M orowitz Archives o f  American Bank N ote Com pany. The Far Eastern Departm ent M anager, 
G. W. Combs, was particularly worried about competition from the big British printer, W aterloo & Co.
’’’ All telegraph comm unications were coded. In this exam ple, Payne in Shanghai was informed that 
the model notes would leave the U.S. on 11 April via the S.S. President P ierce. The actual coded message 
read: EVFYVehloh AM DUDalrup EVHAFerbak. As cited in the decoded telegram o f  D. E. W oodhull, 
N ew  York, to Payne, H. F, April 4, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
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T. V. says he is going to use the C. G. U. notes in other places than in 
Shanghai and will order a lot o f  them."®
Another ANBC agent in Shanghai, G. H. Lynott, remained concerned about the 
pricing for the notes and suggested via cable that the company modify one o f the 
technical printing specifications. This would lower the cost and give the company a bit 
more leverage in negotiating a final price. Lynott realized the potential for future orders 
from the Central Bank and expressed a sense o f urgency similar to H. F. Payne:
This order is the first step in plan recommended by Kemmerer 
commission. If  plan works and according to the general opinion it will, 
then these notes will be only authorized issue in China and will be ordered 
in large quantities. Therefore imperative we should get business ..." '
However, despite its agents in Shanghai clamoring for better pricing, G. W. Combs 
felt that until very large orders were received, ABNC would hold firm on its price bid. 
Essentially, regardless o f order size, the company had to meet a certain profit margin. 
Combs further informed the agents that if the Central Bank o f China became the sole 
bank o f issue, prices for printing would be revised to retain the business."’
The Central Bank o f  China accepted the CGU note design (see Appendix: 
Illustrations 6-14) and pricing. This was confirmed in writing in a letter from Jian Chen,
M emo sent to ANBC head office regarding a counterfeiting problem with a $5 Chinese note that was 
then in circulation in China. Payne was getting pressure from Soong's assistant, Jian Chen. The CGU 
m odel note situation w as outlined on page tw o o f  the m em o as written by H. F. Payne, Shanghai, to Com bs, 
G. W, April 11, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
Telegram from G.H. Lynott in Shanghai to A BN C head office in New York, May 5, 1930,
M orowitz Archives.
G. W. C om bs, N ew  York, to Lynott, G. H, M ay 8, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
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Deputy Governor, to G.H. Lynott at his Shanghai office. This initial order covered the 
production o f  CGU notes in five different denominations. The face value o f this order (in 
CGU’s) totaled 10,000,000 with a total number o f  printed pieces at 12,780,000."’
Upon the approval o f the design o f  the note, ABNC also sent proof notes to the 
Central Bank showing the position o f secret marks. These marks were done by the 
engravers and given to the customers as an anti-counterfeiting measure. While this writer 
has made queries with note dealers regarding secret marks, none had knowledge o f their 
location on the note itself." ''
G.W. Combs pricing strategy obviously worked. Lynott sent the order with final 
quantities and price speeifieations to New York a few days later.'”  While he too hoped 
for larger quantities ordered, Lynott at least passed on some o f the optimism for the CGU 
notes:
We have taken this matter up with the M inister o f  Finance and the bank 
officials, but owing to the present political situation and also to the fact 
that they have not had a chanee to try these notes out, they do not feel that 
they are in a position to increase their order at the present time. However, 
the officials feel very confident that these notes will go over at a later date 
after they have been put into circulation, for with the low rate o f exchange
Jian Chen, Shanghai, to Lynott, George H, M ay 12,1930, M orow itz Archives.
G.H. Lynott, Shanghai, to Central Bank o f  China, Septem ber 12, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
The agreed upon prices (per thousand notes printed) w ere as follows: Ones $17.00, Fives $22.00, 
Tens $26.00, 20 cents - $12.50, 10 cents - $8.50 Lynott's order also advised that he be contacted before the 
printing was complete as "Bank may w ish to increase quantities." This was not ju s t a  drive for more 
business volum e but also a matter o f  practicality. It did save tim e and expense for the printers to keep the 
presses going w hile they were tooled up to produce a particular product. To set up the engraved printing 
plates, test runs, etc., all took tim e and expense.
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for silver nearly all important articles are now being quoted by stores and 
importers in gold dollars. For this reason the officials feel that the gold 
notes will be much more readily accepted now than would have been the 
case had not importers and merchants already started quoting in gold .'”
The first shipment o f  CGU notes left San Francisco on September 19, 1930. They 
were shipped by a steamer o f the Dollar Ship Lines -  the S.S. President Fillmore. The 
gross weight o f the shipment was 1,650 lbs. The amount billed to China’s Central Bank 
totaled $9,107.28 (see Appendix: Document 8).
This first shipment and subsequent ones followed the same pattern according to the 
archival record. First, a letter advised the Central Bank that a shipment was forthcoming. 
The letter stated the contents o f  each case in the shipment. This included the number o f 
bank notes in a specific case, and the series o f serial numbers printed on those notes. The 
actual bill for the shipment was enclosed in the letter. The bill stated that a sight draft for 
payment would be presented in Shanghai. In the case o f all the GCU deliveries in 1930- 
31, the sight draft was handled through the American Express Co. office in Shanghai.'”  
This American company had opened its first office in Hong Kong in 1916. A year 
later, three additional offices were opened in Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. Called 
""Meiguo Yunlong Yinhang” in Chinese, its Shanghai office did some banking business in
G.H Lynott, Shanghai, to  G. W. Combs, July 3, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
G.W . Combs, N ew  York, to The Central Bank o f  China, Septem ber 10, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
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addition to its freight agent duties. For example, it purchased and sold foreign exchange 
and also issued travelers checks.'^*
The American Express Company (AMEX) was the preferred shipping agent for 
ABNC. A second letter was drafted to advise AMEX that the cases o f  freight had been 
delivered to the Railway Express agency office. This letter also confirmed that the 
shipment was to be forwarded to its final destination -  Shanghai, and delivered to the 
final address o f  the Central Bank. AMEX was to take care o f the “bill o f  lading” and any 
other necessary shipping documents. ANBC attached a sight draft to the letter, which 
would accompany the bill o f  lading and would be presented to the AMEX office for 
payment. A final but standard note in the letter would request that ANBC be contacted 
via telegraph when the ship left port (usually San Francisco).
AMEX confirmed first in writing that its office had received the shipment from the 
Railway Express Agency denoting that company’s receipt numbers for the cases 
received. Second, AMEX confirmed in writing to ABNC that it was handling the 
shipping as agent, enclosed a copy o f  the bill o f  lading its office generated, and enclosed 
its bill for its services. Third, the AMEX export agent in San Francisco sent a form letter 
to ANBC stating that the ship had left port for Shanghai. But this was only done after a 
short telegraph was sent to ANBC first by the same agent confirming that the ship had 
indeed cleared the docks and had sailed.
'^*Ji Zhaojin, A History o f  M odem  Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline o f  C hina’s Finance 
Capitalism .” (N ew  York. 2003'). 156.
ANBC already had a long working relationship w ith AM EX outside the scope o f  freight-forwarding 
and shipping matters. The now-fam ous AM EX  “travelers checks” had been printed by ANBC beginning in 
1891. This information was derived from the financial w ebsite w ww.fundinguniverse.com /com pany- 
histories/Am erican-Banknote-Corporation-Com pany-H istory.
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All bank note shipments by ANBC were insured. And in the case o f  the CGU 
shipments o f 1930-31, the insurer was the Federal Insurance C o m p a n y . T h e  coverage 
on the policy noted the value o f the shipment and stated the origination point (New York) 
o f  the shipping route to its final destination (Shanghai). ANBC set the value o f the cargo 
for insurance purposes and usually set the amount just slightly higher than the total 
amount that was being billed to the Central Bank in Shanghai.''*'
This raises a question o f how did a company insure the transport o f money? While all 
the shipping documents have the cargo listed as “printed matter,” obviously ABNC was 
in the business o f printing primarily currency and stock certificates. The insurers were 
clearly aware o f this. Once onboard ship, ABNC currency shipments were often placed 
in “specie tank” storage or special lock-up for added s e c u r i t y . Ty p i c a l l y ,  these storage 
areas were not full on the westbound voyage to China. But on shipments back to North 
America, most shippers, especially Canadian Pacific Lines, used specie tank lock-up for 
silk cargo or other freight o f high value.
On each "Certificate o f  Insurance" issued, the m anagers o f  the firm w ere listed as "Chubb & Son." 
Incorporated in N ew  Jersey, Federal Insurance Co. listed offices in Jersey City and also N ew  York City. 
Today, Chubb Insurance is still a very large player in the insurance field.
For example, on the shipment o f  9/19/30, the Central Bank was billed $9,107.28 for the total 
shipment. The certificate o f  insurance was written for $9,500.00. This was noted on certificate number 
F860649 issued Septem ber 9, 1930 in the M orowitz Archives o f  the American Bank N ote Company.
The certificate o f  insurance often specified in writing that the "printed matter" be held during transit 
in specie tank storage - but not always. Further, in the ABNC records, it does not appear that the company 
had to pay a higher insurance rate if  specie tank storage was not specified.
Vessels transporting bullion or high value cargo had a large iron com partm ent that was sealed by 
padlocks or combination lock. This onboard "tank" w as generally in one o f the shelter decks. Access was 
under the jurisdiction o f  the C h ief Officer and the Purser. This information w as cited by researchers at the 
National M aritime M useum  Library in San Francisco as provided by John M uir and Bill Kooiman, Re: 
Specie Storage, e-mail m essage to author, Septem ber 12, 2006.
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Freight and insurance charges were all pre-paid by ANBC and added on to the 
invoice submitted to the Central Bank. AMEX billed transportation from New York to 
San Francisco at $12.85 per lOOlbs., plus ten cents per each $100 o f value. The rate by 
sea from San Francisco to Shanghai was based on a 3 percent ad valorem  o f the value 
ANBC placed on the shipment. For example, the initial shipment o f GCU notes was 
valued at $8,600. The freight charge added was $258.00 (8,600. x .03). Accordingly in 
this example, the bill presented to the bank officials in Shanghai totaled $9,107.28.
Needless to say, in 1930 businesses did not have the modern technology o f commerce 
that we take for granted today — computers, fax, and wire transfers. Accordingly, one 
sees a voluminous “paper trail” with each and every sale and transport o f a product. 
Telegraph correspondence was used extensively across the pacific between China and the 
United States as well as with London -  the world center o f financial exchange.
ANBC continued its shipment o f  CGU notes throughout 1930. Most o f  the shipments 
left the U.S. from the port o f  San Francisco. However, in the latter half o f 1930, T.V. 
Soong and his management team expressed dissatisfaction with the level o f service 
provided by AMEX and the Dollar Ship Lines. They requested that ANBC use Canadian 
Pacific Lines as shipping agent and transport their cargo from Vancouver, British 
Columbia in Canada. Their reasons for the change were varied. First o f  all, Soong and 
his associates were dealing from a position o f strength because ultimately they were “the 
customer” and were paying all the bills for printing and shipping. Secondly, there were 
payment issues involving the sight drafts with AMEX. A third reason was the docking 
position o f Canadian Pacific ships in Shanghai was much better than that o f the Dollar 
Ship Line. This saved the Central Bank in costs o f temporary warehousing, customs
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approval, and final trucking o f cargo to the bank’s address on Shanghai’s Bund.''*'* As 
the ANBC agent H. F. Payne wrote after the first Canadian Pacific shipment arrived, the 
Central Bank was pleased:
Everything went like clockwork and the bank is much pleased. The 
steamer reached here Sunday and that afternoon the 17 cases were in the 
strong room o f the Canadian Pacific at their office on the Bund, only a 
stone’s throw away from the bank. The Canadian Pacific people had 
arranged with the Customs to be allowed to take delivery, so all there was 
to do was to endorse the bill o f  lading, get the Canadian Pacific’s delivery 
order “chopped” by the Customs and turn it over to the bank -  a matter o f  
half an hour.''*^
By January 1931, the initial order for CGU notes was substantially complete and had 
been received by China’s Central Bank (see Appendix: Illustrations 6-14).''*'* But not all 
banking officials in Shanghai were pleased about the rising power and stature o f a Central 
Bank. According to the ABNC records, there was resentment because some o f the larger 
private banks could no longer privately order the printing o f bank notes and then issue the 
notes themselves. The very purpose o f having a central bank for a country was the ability
''''' In a  highly detailed four-page memorandum, Payne expanded on the problem s that Soong, Chen, et 
al, had w ith using American Express and the D ollar Line. AM LX really was not the problem. Rather it 
was m ishandling o f  freight by the Dollar Line. He also made the point that if  this w as the way D ollar Line 
treated a governm ent institution like the Central Bank, im agine the frustration other banks must be having. 
This w as a  significant problem as cited in a letter from H. F. Payne, Shanghai, to  G. W. Combs, O ctober 
23, 1930, M orow itz Archives.
H.F Payne, Shanghai, to  G. W. Combs, N ovem ber 18, 1930, M orowitz Archives.
All shipm ents o f  the CGU notes included partial shipments o f  each denom ination ordered. The 
Central Bank liked it this way as they could begin distributing the notes earlier in the preparation o f  their 
release. As the first shipment sailed for Shanghai, th is was cited in a letter from H.F Payne, Shanghai, to
G. W. Combs, Septem ber 24, 1930, M orowitz A rchives o f  American Bank Note Company.
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to control the issuance o f  currency, and stabilize national finance. Obviously, T.V. 
Soong could not move the Central Bank forward in its role if other banks were still 
issuing bank notes. In a memo to his New York office, H. F. Payne wrote; “It is the 
natural desire o f  the government to cut down on the banks of issue and later have the 
Central Bank do it all, but that day will not come this year nor next.” ''*’ Clearly, the other 
large banks in China still had influence with the political officials to continue their 
current practices.
T.V. Soong was ready to begin using the CGU notes, but some issues slowed down 
the process. The Central Bank was managed well, but still had to build up its reputation 
with the populace. Further, as M inister o f Finance Soong still had to work with the 
Legislative Yuan, their reservations about the notes, along with concerns about the price 
o f  silver, also affected the process.'*^
It is important to remember that while the CGU notes had not yet been issued, the 
CGU process in terms o f  collecting import duties was well underway. Tariff values o f 
dutiable goods had increased since March 1930 due partly to China’s new autonomy in 
this area. Chinese dollars, taels, or other local currencies were converted to CGU values 
in a system that set rates daily based on market conditions. Beginning in 1931, these 
rates were stated in terms o f  CGU.
On May 1, 1931, the Central Bank began to issue the CGU notes to help facilitate 
payments o f  import duties.*'*^ The notes held by the bank were secured at least 60 per
H. F. Payne, Shanghai, to G. W. Com bs, January 27, 1931, M orowitz Archives. 
Ibid., 1.
A rthur Young, China's N ation-Building Effort. 46-48.
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cent in gold or deposits payable in gold, with the remaining 40 per cent in other 
obligations payable in gold. Many businesses or other entities set up CGU accounts at 
the Central Bank where they could obtain cashier’s checks to make payments. This made 
sense if  you were a major importer and had to pay tariff duties in CGU. It was also smart 
to do because all tariff revenues were collected and centralized in the national treasury. 
Finally, it diminished the need for direct payment in silver to the bank. Growth in use o f 
the new notes was slow. However, overall growth in payments in CGU by accounts grew 
steadily. It was reported that in 1930, only 12 per cent o f total import duty was received 
directly in CGU. This rose to 63 per cent in 1931, 75 per cent in 1932, and 88 percent in 
1933.
While the CGU notes began being used in May, the work o f ANBC was not yet done. 
Printing duties notwithstanding, the company was asked by the Central Bank for 
additional support:
The Gold Customs Unit notes are out, but are not used at all so far outside 
o f  Customs transactions. The bank asked us to take care o f the what you 
might call propaganda connected therewith, and we have inspired a couple 
o f newspapers and magazine articles which pleased them. We have to 
handle this with care, for the other banks are not so keen on the CGU 
notes and we have their good will to consider as well as that o f the Central 
Bank.'"®
H. F. Payne, Shanghai, to G. W. Combs, June 2, 1931, M orow itz Archives.
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Clearly, the company was still doing business throughout China with many different 
banks. ANBC did not want to antagonize any o f its customers and sought to keep 
everyone content.
The CGU notes were used in China until 1949. A greater variety o f denominations 
were ordered and used with the largest being the 250,000 CGU note issued in 1948. 
Throughout the years from 1930-1946, almost all the CGU notes were printed by ANBC. 
But other firms -  both foreign and domestic, handled many subsequent orders beginning 
in 1947.'^'
While many in the numismatic field recognize the CGU note as traded around the 
world today, few people are aware o f  the process o f its design, production, and delivery. 
This chapter has recounted that story within the much bigger picture o f  China’s 
financial/economic history. With long experience and determination, ANBC produced a 
fine quality note for the CGU program.
W ard D. Smith and Brian M atravers, Chinese Banknotes. 80-82.
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CHAPTER 9 
AFTERMATH
After Edwin Kemmerer had completed his job in China and returned to Princeton, 
several members o f his China team stayed behind having accepted positions in various 
branches o f the Nationalist government. Arthur Young and F.B. Lynch were two o f these 
team members. Reports on CGU matters and other programs were sent to Kemmerer 
regularly by them, at least on a personal basis. Further, on occasion in 1930-31, T.V. 
Soong used these Americans (now working for him directly) to query Kemmerer on 
various monetary questions. Thus while Kemmerer’s obligations were contractually 
complete, his advice was still sought in the context o f his global experience. Kemmerer 
remained an economic conservative and clearly felt bis ideas and programs were best for 
China. The country was not on a gold standard as he would have liked, but linking the 
import customs to gold currencies was a positive first step.
It is also interesting to note that Kemmerer kept the U. S. State Department informed 
o f his assignment before he began his work in China. Specifically, he met with Stanley 
Hornbeck, Washington’s chief diplomat on China and East Asian matters.'^’ Moreover, 
the record suggests that upon returning from China, Kemmerer provided Hornbeck copies 
o f the various reports and projects o f law that he had produced for China. This
Kemmerer personal diary entry, October 26, 1928, Box 483, K em m erer Papers.
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can be substantiated as this writer found a confidential memo in the archival material 
from Hornbeck to Kemmerer. The memo noted that Hornbeck was returning a copy o f 
one o f the China reports to Kemmerer since an extra one had been sent by mistake.'^’ 
This raises a possible ethics question. Was Kemmerer bound by Soong to strict 
confidentiality or conversely, was he told by Soong for example to “show the Americans 
what we are trying to reform -  inform them o f our progress?” Did Kemmerer breach any 
matter o f  confidentiality involving Soong? This is o f course hypothetical, but perhaps a 
more exhaustive study o f  Kemmerer’s diaries and Soong’s private papers might possibly 
shed light on this issue.
By September 1930, the CGU program was moving along well. The problem o f  the 
depreciation o f  silver had been practically offset. While trade levels were down, the 
customs revenues were adequate now to cover foreign loan service and also produce 
some surplus to the government. Lynch, now working at the Central Bank o f  China had 
set up a division which sold CGU against dollars, pounds sterling, and other foreign 
currencies."’'* In his view. Lynch felt the program thus far had “saved the bacon for the 
government” and should be made permanent."^ He went on to report that most o f  the 
CGU sales were transacted against dollars or sterling, thus giving China gold funds
M em orandum, Stanley Hornbeck to Edwin Kemmerer, Box 67, The Stanley Hornbeck Papers, 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Arthur Young, M inistry o f  Finance, Shanghai, to Edwin Kemmerer, Septem ber 6, 1930, File: 
Young, Box 89, K em m erer Papers.
F.B. Lynch, Central Bank o f  China, Shanghai, to  Edwin Kemmerer, Septem ber 14, 1930, File: 
Lynch, Box 88, K em m erer Papers.
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abroad in various accounts for payment o f  loans and indemnities. Some 60 percent o f 
China’s foreign custom-secured obligations were being paid in this manner.
As previously mentioned, by years end, shipments o f  CGU notes from the first orders 
were substantially complete and in possession o f  the Central Bank. Discussion was 
underway as to what value to be given to the notes if  they were put into circulation for the 
primary benefit o f importers. They were denominated only in terms o f CGU, but thus far 
there had been no statement o f value relative to a CGU. But for customs duties 
collections, a value o f $.40 per CGU was accepted by banks, import houses, and traders -  
in other words, widely known. Young expanded on this in a memo to Kemmerer, but in 
the context o f  Soong considering a whole new national currency program which might 
include new coinage:
The 40 cent unit has become widely known as the basis for collection of 
Customs duties. The collection o f import duties in terms o f  this unit has 
been highly successful. The Central Bank has added to its prestige, 
through the operations o f the office in the bank Lynch has organized for 
sale o f gold units. This office sells them against any currencies, both 
ready and forward, and opens accounts in terms o f gold units. Practically 
all the important import houses have accounts in gold units at the Central 
Bank and some o f the Chinese banks are now beginning to sell gold units 
on a small scale. The gold unit therefore, has acquired a certain prestige, 
and has been associated with the successful reform. There is no doubt that
Lynch lo  K emmerer, Septem ber 14, 1930, File: Lynch, Box 88, Kemmerer Papers.
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prejudice would be aroused and criticism, both sincere and insincere, by 
any change in the unit.'^’
Therefore, that is exactly the decision that was made. The CGU would be maintained at 
its level for the foreseeable future.
The CGU notes themselves, controlled by the Central Bank, were covered by a 100 
percent reserve in gold or gold exchange currencies. Importers began using the notes in 
May 1931 to pay duties or simply used their CGU accounts, whichever was more 
convenient for them. This was a positive step as the various port cities o f  China did not 
always have a local branch o f  the Central Bank to facilitate their payments.
Young made two other recommendations to Soong relative to the CGU program: 1 ) 
that the Central Bank be allowed to keep gold bullion bars as part o f  the CGU reserve 
and, 2) that China’s Central Bank should not take any speculative position in silver 
within the CGU Division. If  any speculation were done, it must be done separately from 
the CGU account structure."’" The data suggests that both specifics were followed in the 
beginning, but the latter became questionable in the context of the worldwide silver 
markets o f  1933-35.
For the Central Bank itself, publie announcements were made to show the efficacy o f 
the program, its public commencement, and also to show transparency to the public. For 
example, one official press release noted that “the amount o f notes in circulation and the
Arthur Young, M inistry o f  Finance, Shanghai, to Edwin K emmerer, January 9, 1931, File: Young, 
Box 88, Kemmerer Papers.
A rthur Y oung to  T.V. Soong, M inister o f  Finance, April 1, 1931. M em orandum for the M inister o f  
Finance, The Arthur Y oung Papers, Box 31.
77
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
reserves held against them will be published every ten days, as is done in the case o f 
Central Bank notes now outstanding, and will be subject to the audit o f the Supervisory 
Committee o f  the Bank.” '^ ® The Customs Department made similar public 
announcements via their official notifications (see Appendix: Document 1).
As May o f  1931 brought news o f  progress from Customs and the Central Bank, there 
was also negative press on internal matters in China. Political dissent arose against Jiang 
in Canton which resulted in violence. Sun Fo, who had initially made contacts with the 
Americans seeking their help, was a principle player in the revolt. He publicly accused 
Jiang o f  “harboring desires to establish and autoeracy in China.” '“  Young’s take on the 
situation was that Sun Fo was not at all a loss to the government. While Sun carried the 
prestige o f being his father’s son, he was not judged to be a strong competent 
administrator o f  the Railroad Ministry. Obviously, this was an area o f infrastrueture and 
commerce vital to China’s success. Did Sun actually profit from the revolt in Canton? 
While this writer has been unable to arrive at a definitive answer. Young reported back to 
Kemmerer a firm yes. He learned that Sun Fo and H.L.Huang (his former student at 
Princeton and Vice-Minister o f  Railroads, as well as manager o f the Ho Hang Bank), sold 
short all the Chinese Government bonds they could finance and made nice profits on the
Kuo Min N ews Agency, news release, April 23, 1931. See also The Shanghai Evening Post and 
M ercury. April, 23, 1931 ,Section II, I . and The C hina Press. April 24, I9 3 I, I.
"New Revolt by Canton; 200 Killed, ” Boston Evening Transcript. M onday, May 18,1931. Sourced 
from the Stanley Hornbeck Papers, File: 19 3 1, Box 67, The Floover Institution on War, Revolution, And 
Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
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announcement o f the problems in Canton! Lai also wrote that there was a strong 
faction o f  GMD members that felt Sun Fo profited as well.'^’
The American Bank Note Company continued to produce the CGU notes and other 
bank notes for China until 1947. However, CGU notes were also produced by other 
foreign printers as well. Competition was strong and the American printer did not have a 
monopoly. For the Central Bank, competitive bidding for bank note printing was the 
norm. Further, it should be noted that while this writer’s search was not exhaustive, no 
connection could be found between Kemmerer and ANBC or any o f his China 
Commission members. No correspondence o f any kind was discovered, only a few 
sample CGU notes in the personal papers o f  Arthur Young (see Appendix: Illustrations 6- 
14).
As the world’s financial markets underwent computerization in later years, the 
fortunes o f  ABNC began to wane. The company was purchased in 1969 by the B.T.B. 
Corporation and operated as a subsidiary. The name was changed to International 
Banknote Company and by the mid-1980’s still produced a broad spectrum o f  security 
paper products, currency, food stamps, airline tickets, and various paper licenses. In the 
late 1980’s, the company moved into the field o f holography as an anti-counterfeiting 
technology. The need to diversify was clear. Security paper such as stocks and bonds 
were held in accounts digitally, greatly reducing the need for printing. As for currency, 
ANBC was still a provider, but had no involvement in US dollars, pounds, marks, yen, or
A rthur Young, Shanghai, to Edwin K em m erer, July 13, 1931, handwritten notes pages 4-5. File: 
Young, Box 89, The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, The Seeley M udd Transcript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, N ew  Jersey.
Lai, “A Study o f  a Fallen D em ocrat,” 128-129.
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any other major currency. Due to these business trends and a diminished demand for 
paper printing, the company suffered through several re-organizations, proxy battles, and 
eventually declared bankruptcy in 1999 and again in 2005. Today a smaller, re-organized 
American Banknote Corporation operates as a holding company with American Bank 
Note Company (ABNC) as one o f  its prineipal subsidiaries.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS
By 1929 the government finances o f China were in desperate need o f reform and 
modernization. The external debts o f the country had steadily risen since 1895. China 
had little control over the foreign-run treaty ports and the collection o f  customs or other 
taxes. Extraterritoriality was a privilege to the foreign powers among other practices that 
were clearly in their favor.
The foreign powers and their financial institutions recognized that China had only one 
dependable revenue stream from which to pay its indemnities and debts -  the import 
customs collected from abroad. This revenue continued to be pledged to pay external 
debt, and that left little for China’s domestic needs.
The Nanjing Government obviously needed help and invited a team o f American 
financial experts to help organize China’s finances, create a budget, and begin to pay 
down the burgeoning external debt -  o f  which much was in arrears. An early 
recommendation was to place the Customs revenues on a gold exchange basis and initiate 
tbe use o f the customs gold unit or CGU.
The CGU program was a suceess for China. In a 1926 internal government report 
reviewed by Arthur Young, the country had less than $2 million (Chinese) left over in a 
single three-month period after debt payments. Compare this with the report noted by
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Young that, ten years later, annual revenue available after debt payments was nearly $700 
million (Chinese).'^’ Several developments made this possible.
When the customs revenues were shifted to a gold basis, it helped preserve the value 
o f  this revenue against the problems o f  volatile silver prices. The CGU program allowed 
the government to draw in foreign currencies as well as silver. Relationships and 
accounts were established by the Central Bank with leading foreign banks. The Customs 
Service could withdraw funds from the CGU system at the Central bank to service the 
foreign loans collateralized by customs revenues. For China this was a strong move 
toward currency reform. True, the Kemmerer Commission’s report also wanted to call 
the CGU the sun, but this change was not made. The tael system was also slowly 
abolished, as payments were converted to the CGU system.
As Paul Trescott noted, adoption o f the CGU system helped raise customs revenues 
from $244 million in 1929 to $388 million (Chinese) by 1931.'^'* Obviously, this 
additional revenue helped strengthen China’s credit abroad. Interest on loans that was in 
arrears could be brought current, making China attractive for foreign investment in 
economic development.
The CGU system also demonstrated for its administrators the important value o f 
experience. The Customs staff became increasingly Chinese, with advancement 
opportunities. Central Bank employees learned to work with procedures administratively 
not unlike those o f other foreign banks. Experience was gained in foreign exchange and 
financial management. This was good for both the individual and the overall success o f
Arthur Young, China's Nation-Building Effort. 142. 
Trescott, "The Money Doctor in C hina,” 134.
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the organization. As Andrea McElderry wrote, employees needed the western technical 
experience required for the job, and in the larger framework o f helping the organization 
and the nation.'^’
As for the CGU notes themselves, while they did not circulate initially, they provided 
something tangible and accountable in support o f the CGU system. While the CGU 
system, in aecounting terms, could have operated without the CGU notes, their use made 
transactions easier. They remained in use until 1949. China needed quality notes from a 
reliable source. The American Bank Note Company was experienced worldwide in the 
production o f notes. Further, the company had the physical capacity to pursue the orders 
for the CGU notes while at the same time continuing to supply other customers in China. 
The company certainly had competition for the business -  especially from large British 
firms such as Waterloo & Co., but they also had to compete with smaller domestic 
printers. ANBC worked diligently on its relationship with T.V. Soong and his staff at the 
Central Bank. Soong was not a passive customer and expressed little tolerance for 
mistakes. ANBC learned to react quickly to such situations and maintain a successful 
relationship. As noted earlier, the company was even asked to help “market” the notes in 
the press to the banking/financial public.
The system utilizing the customs gold units and notes served China well. Until the 
Japanese attack in Manchuria in September 1931, the process for managing and reducing 
China’s debt was positive. The subsequent war against the Japanese was a devastating 
drain on the finances o f China. The loss o f  revenues from the various ports o f Manchuria 
alone constituted almost 15 percent o f the government’s budget. An interesting “what i f ’
Andrea M cElderry, "Confucian Capitalism?; Corporate values in Republican Banking," M odem  
C hina 12: 3 (July 1986): 406-410.
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question comes to mind had the war not occurred. Since more than $200 million had 
already been reduced from the national foreign debt before the WWII years, this writer 
firmly believes the process o f debt reduction would have continued. Accordingly, this 
would have raised China’s credit stature internationally, allowing for more foreign 
investment for modernization.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Share o f Manchuria and North China’s Customs Revenue (amounts in Chinese 
Dollars). Quoting Chinese Sources.... *includes seven ports: Aigun, Elarbin, Hanchun, 
Lungchingtsun, Antung, Dairen, and Newchwang; **includes six ports: Chinwangtao, 
Tientsin, Lungknow, Chefoo, Weihaiwei, and Kiaochow. Source: Frank Kai-Ming Su 
and Alvin Barber, “China’s Tariff Autonomy, Fact or Myth, ” Far Eastern Survey 5, no. 
12(3 June 1936): 119.
Year Total
Customs
Revenue
Manchuria*
Customs
Revenue
% o f  Total North
China**
Customs
Revenue
% o f  Total 
Imports
1929 238,109,285 34,900,237 14.66% 37,111,429 15.59%
1930 281,405,583 38,254,072 13.59% 37,964,664 13.49%
1931 385,002,673 40,803,328 10.60% 59,763,728 15.52%
1932 311,976,210 67,769,336 21.72%
1933 339,524,490 70,009,399 20.62%
1934 334,645,408 68,477,102 20.46%
Table 2: Allocation o f the Sino-Japanese War Indemnity. Source: Li, Mu Yang, “Essays 
on Public Finance and Economic Development in a Historical Institutional Perspective: 
China 1840-1911,” PhD diss., Stanford University, Stanford, California, 2003, 130.
Category Amount (million yen)
"Extraordinary military special account" 79.0
Army Expansion Fund 56.8
Navy Expansion Fund 139.3
Yawata Iron and Steel Mill Startup Fund 0.6
Railroads, ete. Expansion Fund 3.2
Taiwan Operations Fund 12.0
Royal Expenses 70.0
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Table 3: Boxer Indemnity Owed by China. Source; The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, box 
58, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Country Percentage o f Total Indemnity
Russia 28.97136
Germany 20.01567
France 15.75072
Great Britain 11.24901
Japan 7.7318
United States 7.31979
Italy 5.91489
Belgium 1.88541
Austria-Hungary 0.88976
The Netherlands 0.1738
International Claims 0.03326
Spain 0.03007
Portugal 0.0205
Sweden and Norway 0.01396
Total 100.00
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Table 4: Foreign Enterprises in China— 1924. Source: Memorandum by Edwin 
Kemmerer dated 23 September 1929 where he quotes Bankers Weekly #443 o f 1926. 
The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, item 19, file 1-7, box 58, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript 
Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Nationality Number o f Enterprises
United States 470
Austria 6
Belgium 26
Great Britain 726
Chili 2
Czechoslovakia 4
Denmark 39
Holland 38
France 255
Germany 253
Italy 49
Japan 4,278
Norway 19
Poland 1
Portugal 131
Russia 934
Spain 14
Sweden 12
Switzerland 29
Total 7286
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Table 5: The Amount o f  Unfavorable Trade Balance as Shown in the Customs Report 
and the Actual Amount o f  Unfavorable Trade Balance. Source: Memorandum by Edwin 
Kemmerer dated 23 September 1929 where he quotes Bankers Weekly #443 o f 1926. 
The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, item 19, file 1-7, box 58, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript 
Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Year Amount o f Unfavorable Balance 
in Haikwan taels
1912 102,576,628
1913 166,857,011
1914 213,014,753
1915 35,614,555
1916 33,248,038
1917 86,587,144
1918 69,010,051
1919 16,188,270
1920 220,618,930
1921 304,866,902
1922 290,157,719
1923 170,485,471
1924 267,317,688
Table 6: Combined Maritime and Native Customs Revenues And Amounts Thereof Paid 
on Foreign Loans and Indemnities (in pound sterling). China’s Tariff Autonomy, Fact or 
Myth by Frank Kai-Ming Su and Alvin Barber, Far Eastern Survey 5, no. 12 (June 3, 
1936), 119. Quoting Chinese Sources...
Year Total Amounts Paid on Foreign 
Loans, Etc.
1927 7,737,726 7,665,381
1928 10,012,913 7,562,151
1929 18,191,695 7,774,180
1930 15,529,200 7,762,280
1931 16,062,730 8,262,460
1932 15,457,668 6,144,797
1933 16,264,877 5,291,919
1934 17,666,997 5,066,901
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Table 7: Rates o f  Exchange, 1926 to Date. Source; Memorandum from Edwin 
Kemmerer to T.V. Soong dated 25 May 1929. Arthur Young Papers, box 31, The 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Stanford University, Stanford, 
California.
Penee per
Shanghai Taels per U.S. dollars per 100 Shanghai
Date $100 Local Currency Shanghai Taels Taels
1926 (average) 68.041 33.540
1927 (average) 72.7 61.401 30.302
1928 (average) 72.3 63.706 31.420
1926-28 (average) 64.383 31.754
January 1929
(average) 71.8 62.685 31.000
February 1929
(average) 71.8 61.681 30.487
March 1929 (average) 71.9 61.766 30.510
April 1929 (average) 71.7 60.490 29.930
May 25, 1929 71.7 56.000 28.750
Table 8; Average Rates o f Exchange, 1926 to Date. Source: Memorandum from Edwin 
Kemmerer to T.V. Soong dated 8 October 1929. Arthur Young Papers, box 31, The 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. Stanford University, Stanford, 
California.
Approx. Cost o f 
Remitting
Rate o f Shanghai $3,300,000 in U
Rate in U.S.$/100 Taels to Local Currency***
Period Shanghai Taels Dollars * * *  local dollars
1926-28, average 64.383 72.5 7,070,000
1928, average 63.706 72.3 7,160,000
Jan., 1929,
average 62.685 71.8 7,330,000
Feb., 1929,
average 61.681 71.8 7,460,000
March, 1929,
average 61.766 71.9 7,450,000
April, 1929,
average 60.490 71.7 7,620,000
May 25, 1929,
average 58.000 71.7 7,930,000
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Table 9: Gold Currencies Conversion Rates For Customs Gold Units (CGU). Chinese 
Economic Bulletin, 26 April 1930. Arthur Young Papers, box 31, The Hoover Institution 
on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Value in
C ountry C urrency CG U 's
Great Britain Sterling/Pence 19.727
United States Gold Dollar 0.400
France Franc 10.184
Japan Gold Yen 0.803
Singapore Dollar 0.705
India Rupee 1.096
Germany Reichmarks 1.679
Netherlands Guilder 0.995
Italy Lires 7.600
Switzerland Franc 2.073
Belgium Belga 2.877
Norway Kroner 1.492
Sweden Kroner 1.492
Denmark Kroner 1.492
Austria Shilling 2.843
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Table 10: ABNC 1858 Association. Source: William Griffiths, The Story o f American 
Bank Note Company (New York: American Bank Note Company, 1959).
Firm
City %
Locations Shares Ownership
Rawdon, Wright, Hatch & Edison New York 5,951 23.90%
Montreal 
New Orleans 
Cincinnati 
Boston
Toppan, Carpenter & Co. New York 
Philadelphia 
Boston 
Cincinnati
5,577 22.40%
Danforth, Perkins & Co. New York 
Philadelphia 
Boston 
Cincinnati
5,428 21.80%
Bald, Cousland & Co. New York 3,312 
Philadelphia
13.30%
Jocelyn, Draper, Welsh & Co. New York 2,092 
Philadelphia
8.40%
Wellstood, Hay & Whiting New York 
Chicago
2,042 8.20%
John E. Gavit Albany 498 2 .00%
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Table 11; Historical Evolution o f  American Bank Note Company. Source: William H 
Griffiths. The Story o f American Bank Note Company (New York: American Bank Note 
Company), 1959.
Historical Evolution o f  American Bank N ote Company
t C* ' -4 liit, Cïsiüti * C» , ' Teww. &»»«*« & C». :
SiiWf. ••«a t  U-
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Table 12: ANBC Shipment o f Custom Gold Units. Source: Morowitz Archives 
American Bank Note Co.
o f
CASE SERIAL
DATE PORT SHIP # AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
S.S. PRESIDENT TEN 000001-
9/19/1930 SFO FILLM ORE 2198 100,000 CENT 100000
TEN SPECIM EN
4,000 CENT N OTES
TEN 100001-
2199 100,000 CENT 200000
GROSS W EIGHT OF
SHIPM ENT: 1,650 000001-
LBS. 2200 100,000 20 CENT 100000
SPECIM EN
4,000 20 CENT N OTES
000001-
2201 50,000 1 CGU 050000
TOTAL AM OUNT SPECIM EN
BILLED TO 4,000 1 CGU N OTES
CENTRAL BANK OF 000001-
CHINA: 2202 50,000 5 CGU 050000
SPECIM EN
$9,107.28 4,000 5 CGU N O TES
050001-
2203 50,000 5 CGU 100000
000001-
2204 50,000 10 CGU 050000
SPECIM EN
4,000 10 CGU NOTES
050001-
2205 50,000 10 CGU 100000
S.S. PRESIDENT TEN 200001-
9/26/1930 SFO LINCOLN 2206 100,000 CENT 300000
TEN 300001-
2207 100,000 CENT 400000
100001-
2208 100,000 20 CENT 200000
GROSS W EIGHT OF
SHIPM ENT: 1,865 200001-
LBS. 2209 100,000 20 CENT 300000
050001-
2210 50,000 1 CGU 100000
100001-
2211 50,000 1 CGU 150000
TOTAL AM OUNT 150001-
BILLED TO 2212 50,000 5 CGU 200000
CENTRAL BANK OF 100001-
CHINA: 2213 50,000 10 CGU 150000
150001-
200000
$10,427.63 2214 50,000 10 CGU
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DATE PORT SHIP CASE AMOUNT DENOM. SERIAL
# NUMBERS
S.S. PRESIDENT TEN 400001-
10/3/1930 SFO W ILSON 2215 100,000 CENT 500000
TEN 500001-
2216 100,000 CENT 600000
TEN 600001-
2217 100,000 CENT 700000
GROSS W EIGHT OF
SHIPM ENT: 2,783 TEN 700001-
LBS. 2218 100,000 CENT 800000
TEN 800001-
2219 100,000 CENT 900000
300001-
2220 100,000 20 CENT 400000
TOTAL AM OUNT 400001-
BILLED TO 2221 100,000 20 CENT 500000
CENTRAL BANK OF 500001-
CHINA: 2222 100,000 20 CENT 600000
100001-
$15,355.42 2223 50,000 1 CGU 150000
150001-
2224 50,000 1 CGU 200000
200001-
2225 50,000 5 CGU 250000
250001-
2226 50,000 5 CGU 300000
200001-
2227 50,000 10 CGU 250000
250001-
2228 50,000 10 CGU 300000
S.S. PRESIDENT TEN 900001-
10/10/1930 SFO M ADISON 2229 100,000 CENT 1000000
TEN AOOOOOl-
2230 100,000 CENT A 100000
TEN A 100001-
2231 100,000 CENT A200000
GROSS W EIGHT OF
SHIPM ENT: 5,462 TEN A200001-
LBS. 2232 100,000 CENT A300000
TEN A300001-
2233 100,000 CENT A400000
TEN A400001-
2234 100,000 CENT A500000
TOTA L AM OUNT TEN A500001-
BILLED TO 2235 100,000 CENT A600000
CENTRAL BANK OF TEN A600001-
CHINA: 2236 100,000 CENT A700000
600001-
$30,903.88 2237 100,000 20 CENT 700000
700001-
2238 100,000 20 CENT 800000
800001-
2239 100,000 20 CENT 900000
900001-
2240 100,000 20 CENT 1000000
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CASE SERIAL
DATE PORT SHIP # AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
200001-
2241 50,000 1 CGU 250000
250001-
2242 50,000 1 CGU 300000
300001-
2243 50,000 1 CGU 350000
350001-
2244 50,000 1 CGU 400000
300001-
2245 50,000 5 CGU 350000
350001-
2246 50,000 5 CGU 400000
400001-
2247 50,000 5 CGU 450000
450001-
2248 50,000 5 CGU 500000
500001-
2249 50,000 5 CGU 550000
550001-
2250 50,000 5 CGU 600000
600001-
2251 50,000 5 CGU 650000
650001-
2252 50,000 5 CGU 700000
300001-
2253 50,000 10 CGU 350000
350001-
2254 50,000 10 CGU 400000
400001-
2255 50,000 10 CGU 450000
450001-
2256 50,000 10 CGU 500000
S.S. PRESIDENT TEN A 700001-
10,17,1930 SFO VAN BUREN 2257 100,000 CENT
TEN
A800000
A800001-
2258 100,000 CENT A900000
GROSS W EIG HT OF
SHIPM ENT: 4,767 TEN A900001-
LBS. 2259 100,000 CENT
TEN
A 1000000 
BOOOOOl-
2260 100,000 CENT
TEN
B 100000 
B 100001-
2261 100,000 CENT B200000
TOTAL AM OUNT TEN B200001-
BILLED TO 2262 100,000 CENT B300000
CENTRAL BANK OF TEN B300001-
CHINA: 2263 100,000 CENT
TEN
B400000
B400001-
$26,346.40 2264 100,000 CENT B500000
400001-
2265 50,000 1 CGU 450000
450001-
500000
2266 50,000 1 CGU
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CASE SERIAL
DATE PORT SHIP # AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
500001-
2267 50,000 1 CGU 550000
550001-
2268 50,000 1 CGU 600000
600001-
2269 50,000 1 CGU 650000
650001-
2270 50,000 1 CGU 700000
700001-
2271 50,000 1 CGU 750000
750001-
2272 50,000 1 CGU 800000
700001-
2273 50,000 5 CGU 750000
750001-
2274 50,000 5 CGU 800000
800001-
2275 50,000 5 CGU 850000
850001-
2276 50,000 5 CGU 900000
900001-
2277 50,000 5 CGU 950000
950001-
2278 50,000 5 CGU 1000000
500001-
2279 50,000 10 CGU 550000
550001-
2280 50,000 10 CGU 600000
600001-
2281 40,000 10 CGU 640000
640001-
2282 40,000 10 CGU 680000
S.S. PRESIDENT B500001-
10/24/1930 SFO JACKSON 2283 100,000 10 CENT B600000
B600001-
2284 100,000 10 CENT B700000
B700001-
2285 100,000 10 CENT B800000
GROSS W EIGHT OF
SHIPM ENT: 3,128 B800001-
LBS. 2286 100,000 10 CENT B900000
B900001-
2287 100,000 10 CENT B 1000000 
COOOOOl-
2288 100,000 10 CENT C 100000
TOTAL AM OUNT Cl 00001-
BILLED TO 2289 100,000 10 CENT C200000
CENTRAL BANK OF 800001-
CHINA: 2290 50,000 1 CGU 850000
850001-
$17,002.82 2291 50,000 1 CGU 900000
900001-
950000
2292 50,000 1 CGU
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CASE SERIAL
DATE PORT SHIP # AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
950001-
2293 50,000 1 CGU 1000000
AOOOOOl-
2294 50,000 1 CGU A 050000
A050001-
2295 50,000 1 CGU A 100000
AlOOOOl-
2296 50,000 1 CGU A 150000
A150001-
2297 50,000 1 CGU A200000
AOOOOOl-
2298 50,000 5 CGU A050000
A050001-
2299 50,000 5 CGU A 100000
AlOOOOl-
2300 50,000 5 CGU A 150000
S.S. EM PRESS 10 C200001-
10/30/1930 VAN OF JAPAN 2301 100,000 CENTS C300000
10 C300001-
2302 100,000 CENTS C400000
GROSS W EIG HT OF
SHIPM ENT: 2,976 10 C400001-
LBS. 2303 100,000 CENTS C500000
10 C500001-
2304 100,000 CENTS C600000
10 C600001-
2305 100,000 CENTS C700000
TOTAL A M OU NT 10 C700001-
BILLED TO 2306 100,000 CENTS C800000
CENTRAL BAN K  OF A200001-
CHINA: 2307 50,000 1 CGU A250000
A250001-
$16,109.61 2308 50,000 1 CGU A300000
A300001-
2309 50,000 1 CGU A350000
A350001-
2310 50,000 1 CGU A400000
A 400001-
2311 50,000 1 CGU A450000
A 450001-
2312 50,000 1 CGU A500000
A500001-
2313 50,000 1 CGU A550000
A550001-
2314 50,000 1 CGU A600000
A150001-
2315 50,000 5 CGU A200000
A200001-
2316 50,000 5 CGU A250000
A250001-
A300000
2317 50,000 5 CGU
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CASE SERIAL
DATE PORT SHIP
S.S. EM PRESS
# AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
C800001-
11/13/1930 VAN OF ASIA 2318 100,000 10 CENT C900000
C900001-
2319 100,000 10 CENT C 1000000 
DOOOOOl-
2320 100,000 10 CENT D 100000
GROSS W EIG HT OF
SHIPM ENT: 7,542 DlOOOOl-
LBS. 2321 100,000 10 CENT D200000
D200001-
2322 100,000 10 CENT D300000
D300001-
2323 100,000 10 CENT D400000
TOTAL AM OUNT D400001-
BILLED TO 2324 100,000 10 CENT D500000
CENTRAL BANK OF D500001-
CHINA: 2325 100,000 10 CENT D600000
A600001-
$41,217.91 2326 50,000 1 CGU A650000
A650001-
2327 50,000 1 CGU A700000
A700001-
2328 50,000 1 CGU A750000
A750001-
2329 50,000 1 CGU A800000 
A 800001-
2330 50,000 1 CGU A850000
A850001-
2331 50,000 1 CGU A900000
A900001-
2332 50,000 1 CGU A950000
A950001-
2333 50,000 1 CGU A 1000000 
BOOOOOl-
2334 50,000 1 CGU B050000
B050001-
2335 50,000 1 CGU B 100000 
B 100001-
2336 50,000 1 CGU B 150000 
B150001-
2337 50,000 1 CGU B200000
B200001-
2338 50,000 1 CGU B250000
B250001-
2339 50,000 1 CGU B300000
B300001-
2340 50,000 1 CGU B 350000 
B350001-
2341 50,000 1 CGU B400000
B400001-
2342 50,000 1 CGU B450000
B450001-
B500000
2343 50,000 1 CGU
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DATE PORT SHIP
11/27/1930
GROSS W EIGHT OF 
SHIPM ENT: 5,280 
LBS.
TOTAL AM OUNT 
BILLED TO
CENTRAL BANK OF 
CHINA: $28, 762.73
S.S. EM PRESS 
VAN OF CANADA
CASE
# AMOUNT DENOM.
SERIAL
NUMBERS
2344 50,000 1 CGU
B500001- 
B550000
2345 50,000 1 CGU
B550001-
B600000
2346 50,000 1 CGU
B600001-
B650000
2347 50,000 1 CGU
B650001-
B700000
2348 50,000 1 CGU
B700001-
B750000
2349 50,000 1 CGU
B750001-
B800000
2350 50,000 1 CGU
B800001-
B850000
2351 50,000 1 CGU
B850001-
B900000
2352 50,000 1 CGU
B900001-
B950000
2353 50,000 1 CGU
B950001- 
B 1000000
2354 50,000 1 CGU
COOOOOl-
C050000
2355 50,000 1 CGU
C050001- 
C 100000
2356 50,000 5 CGU
A300001-
A350000
2357 50,000 5 CGU
A350001-
A400000
2358 50,000 5 CGU
A400001-
A450000
2359 50,000 5 CGU
A450001-
A500000
2360 50,000 5 CGU
A500001-
A550000
2361 50,000 5 CGU
A550001-
A600000
2362 100,000
10
CENTS
D600001-
D 700000
2363 100,000
10
CENTS
D 700001-
D800000
2364 100,000
10
CENTS
D 800001-
D900000
2365 100,000
10
CENTS
D900001- 
D 1000000
2366 50,000 1 CGU
ClOOOOl- 
C 150000
2367 50,000 1 CGU
C150001-
C200000
2368 50,000 1 CGU
C200001-
C250000
2369 50,000 1 CGU
C250001-
C300000
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DATE PORT SHIP
CASE SERIAL
# AMOUNT DENOM. NUMBERS
C300001-
2370 50,000 1 CGU C350000
C350001-
2371 50,000 1 CGU C400000
C400001-
2372 50,000 1 CGU C450000
C450001-
2373 50,000 1 CGU C500000
C500001-
2374 50,000 1 CGU C550000
C550001-
2375 50,000 1 CGU C600000
C600001-
2376 50,000 1 CGU C650000
C650001-
2377 50,000 1 CGU C700000
C700001-
2378 50,000 1 CGU C750000
C750001-
2379 50.000 I CGU C800000
C800001-
2380 50,000 1 CGU C850000
C8500001-
2381 50,000 1 CGU C900000
C900001-
2382 50,000 1 CGU C950000
C950001-
2383 50,000 1 CGU C 1000000 
DOOOOOl-
2384 50,000 1 CGU D050000
D 050001-
2385 50,000 1 CGU D 100000 
DlOOOOl-
2386 50,000 1 CGU D 150000 
D 150001-
2387 50,000 1 CGU D200000
D200001-
2388 50,000 1 CGU D250000
D250001-
2389 50,000 1 CGU D300000
D300001-
2390 50,000 1 CGU D350000
D350001-
2391 50,000 1 CGU D400000
D400001-
2392 50,000 1 CGU D450000
D450001-
2393 50,000 1 CGU D500000
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Table 13; Rates o f Foreign Exehange Average Bank’s Telegraphic/Transfer Selling 
Rates. Source: Memorandum from Edwin Kemmerer to T.V. Soong dated October 8, 
1929. Arthur Young Papers, box 31, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 
Stanford University, Stanford, California.
U.S. Dollars/100 
Date Shanghai Taels
1928
October 63.509
November 63.625
December 62.916
1929
January 62.685
February 61.681
March 61.766
April 60.490
May 58.962
June 56.636
July 57.035
August 57.009
September 55.456
12 Month Average
Ending 9/30/1929 60.148
8 Month Average
2/1/29-9/30/29 58.630
3 Month Average
July-Aug.-Sept.1929 56.501
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Document 1; Customs Notification. Source: Arthur Young Papers, file 1931, box 31, 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California.
The Central Bank of China
The Central Bank o f China notifies the public that beginning from May V \  1931 
it will be prepared to issue its notes in Customs Gold Units at rates which may be 
uncertained open application. Customs Gold Unit notes will be available in 
denominations o f  CGU, 10.00, C.G.U 5.00, C.G.U. 1.00, 20 Cents and C.G.U. 10 
Cents.
Shanghai, April 24, 1931
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1209
In accordance with instructions received from the Ministry o f  Finance through 
the Inspector General o f Customs the Public is hereby notified that beginning 
from the May 1931, the Central Bank o f China will be prepared to sell 
Customs Gold Unit notes, in denominations o f C.G.UIO.OO, C.G.U 5.00, C.G.U. 
1.00, 20 Cents and C.G.U. 10 Cent, at rates ascertainable from Central Bank o f 
China upon application.
Such bank-notes, the issuance o f which is by Government order confined to the 
Central Bank o f China, will be accepted in unlimited amounts in payment o f 
import duty and other charges payable in Customs Gold Units.
W.R. MEYERS, 
Commissioner o f  Customs
CUSTOM HOUSE 
Shanghai, 24”’ April 1931
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Document 2: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1170. Source: Arthur
Young Papers, box 31.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1170
In contribution o f the Notification stating that on and after February, 1930, the 
Haikuan Tael will be discontinued as the unit o f  calculation o f  duties on imports 
from abroad and that a new Gold Unit will be used, the public is hereby notified 
that the Ministry o f  Finance has now instructed that all payments in respect o f 
Gold Unit duties are to be tendered only in the silver currencies now accepted.
W.R. MEYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs
CUSTOM HOUSE,
Shanghai, 25”’ January, 1930
Document 3: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1171. Source: Arthur 
Young Papers, box 31.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1171
With reference to the Notification stating that on and after f ’ February, 1930, the 
Haikuan Tael will be discontinued as the unit o f  calculation o f duties on importation 
abroad and that a new Gold Unit will be used: and in continuation o f Customs 
Notification No. 1170, the public is hereby notified that from February U' 1930, until 
further notice, the official rate to be used for converting Custom Gold Units into 
Shanghai Taels.
Gold Unit 1.000=Sh. Tls 0.8033
W.R. MYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs
CUSTOMS HOUSE,
Shanghai, 25’” January 1930
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Document 4: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1173. Source: Arthur
Young Papers, box 31.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1173
With reference to the Notification stating that on and after f ‘ February, 1930, the 
Haikuan Tael will be discontinued as the unit o f  calculation o f duties on importation 
abroad and that a new Gold Unit will be used: and in continuation o f  Customs 
Notification No. 1170, the public is hereby notified that the official rate given in 
Notification 1171 is cancelled and that from February U' 1930, until further notice, 
the official rate to be used for converting Customs Gold Units into Shanghai Taels is: 
Gold Units 1.000=Sh. Tis. 0.822
W.R. MYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs
CUSTOM HOUSE, 
Shanghai, January 28 1930.
1820
Document 5: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1176. Source: Arthur 
Young Papers, box 31.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1176
With reference to Customs Notification o f 20 January 1930 stating that on and after 
f  February 1930 the Haikuan Tael would be discontinued as the unit o f  calculation o f 
duties on imports from abroad and that a new Gold Unit will be used, the public is 
hereby notified that drawbacks on imports which have paid duty on the Gold Unit will 
be issued in Customs Gold Units in the form o f Gold Unit Cheques drawn on the 
Central Bank o f  China. Gold Unit Cheques for drawbacks may be used for the 
payment o f  Gold Unit duties and dues, or, at the option o f the holder, will be cashed in 
silver by the Central Bank of China at a rate based upon that bank’s buying rate for 
gold currencies at the time o f encashment.
W.R. MYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs,
CUSTOM HOUSE 
Shanghai, 12'” February 1930
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Document 6: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1177.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1177
The public is hereby notified that as from February 17'”, 1930, until further notice, the 
official rate to be used for converting Customs Gold Units into Shanghai Taels will be: 
Gold Units 1.000=Sh. Tls. 0.8394
W.R. MYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs.
CUSTOM HOUSE 
Shanghai, 12'” February, 1930. 2727
Document 7: New China Daily News. Customs Notification, no. 1178.
CUSTOMS NOTIFICATION
No. 1178
With reference to the Customs Joint Notification o f January 20, 1930, informing the 
public that from February 1, 1930, Customs Duties on Imports from abroad will be 
collected on a Gold basis and be collected on a Gold basis and with special reference 
to the paragraph stating that the rates at which currencies would be accepted in 
payment o f  duties expressed in the new Gold Unit would be officially announced from 
time to time, at least three days public notice being given in the event o f  change in 
rates; the public is hereby notified that the Ministry o f Finance has decided that from 
March 1, 1930, the rate to be used will be the official rate published daily by the 
Exchange Banks at the opening o f the market at 9:30 o ’clock.
W.R. MYERS 
Commissioner o f  Customs.
CUSTOM HOUSE, 
Shanghai, February 22, 1930. 3427
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Document 8; 15-page record o f first CGU shipment from ABNC. Source: Source: 
Morowitz Archives o f  American Bank Note Co.
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M l 97 m  
M ises»
M300»#
P820im
( WWeKf, Wrren S. Beaks
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G/
lÔ,lSfôQ
The OeatRml Beak o î  ChlW, 
15 % # Bwaâ,
8&a%^al,Chlaa.
Dear B lrai-
W* bag to  adTlae d e llT a rlag  te  te a  Baqwaa# OMQNiaqr
a i ^ t  (e j «&MNB, Bbm .n^ftSOS» te r  B h im m t pm  fM a M m f
#te#dal#d to M til from 3an Frame Imoa 8a?%«te#r lM &,aea##W ngy»
-  100,000 -  10 Crate aw te ra  QA& Hal» mte#,mra,O0e8OW
8.000 %##imra« 10 C rate Qemtemm O alt % !» *a»##,fra*
8.000 " 10 " » -  * » brak
SI98 -  100,000 -  10 Crate Oratem* 0*18 Hal» «&»##,«*#.10@m48mO8OO
S os,8m o -  100,000 -  80 Crate Oumtmm 0#M H alt m8te#,te#,0@8omml#QOOO
8.000 Spaatmwwi 20 Cam»# OuOmm Sold Shi»
2.000 " 28 " » » •  w bate
Bra .8201 -  30,000 -  1  Ommtra# Qe3A Hat» 3tetew,Sra«OeOOa!l-Se0QOO
2.000 SpMlmraa 1  A w te ra  Oted te l»  te » ra ,tra #
2.000 " 1  » brak
Boa.28m  -  90,000 -  S OtaAam  Gold t e l »  tetew^tea.OOOQClrOmoOQ
2.000 3pm £mb8 S Coatara Said tel»  Sabra,***
8.000 " 8  •  « * •  b ate
WOS «  90,000 - ,B  Oaaboaa Said t e l »  te«aa,tea.e8Oete»10OOOQ
t e a .2204 -  90,000 R. 10 O ietom  teM  tell»  « # » * ,» * .OCOOOl-teWQOO
8.000 Spaalmraa 10 Caataam Sal#  te l»  te » a a ,tra a
2.000 « 10 " • » » bate
2800 -  90,000 -  10 teabama Cold Dial» te»ra,*ra,Q 00O(af1*0000
Ob Booauat o f  ywir ordar of ISay I m t ,
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• g »
*# oeor hULl, i s  s o ra z isg  # 1 #
a h t ja a i i t ,  «mwmtlmg t o . . ............... .............................................
f o r  h & le k  # e  Im m b d n a m  «  # i # t  d r a f t  o s  y m r  te aw m g h  t& o
m m tlo m  te ^ re a »  Co®$Bti39r*i^w«8hal •
# *  e l a s  « B c lo B »  ow T  t e i ^ t s g  i s r o i e »
I#
fm r m  vary  t r a i y .
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TO w m f  w i # # *
sex tu plio a te
mm. m#m*L # m  # f  m m * ,
1$ wm m m ^
# # # * ( .  W*M*
>u« râ# " R g e rYOU»»OR9CR
* w # e #  » m  
«%w@
a w # " * # ..
##* ,*#  -  w m  _
WWM0 •  8 *  ' * # ] # * #
«Mb W w w * w  m i » m
'Co
g m *  18«w
â
no
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TBK C2ffl?BÆ BMS. Of «aïKA -  Cteito—  ScHd H a l t  M otte
Be «BMÜJMW a a ^  o t mm  l a t t e r  o f te l#  date» 
aâdrm saâ to  t e a  teo r*  B«ak,«£hrJai3« p a r t i a l  te lp M o t 
o f t h e i r  arûm t o f  Star l a s t ,  p a r  @ .S."PRBiaeR wmM Omr 
on teptembmr ]*tli»tc^efthar w ith  @f t e r  b i l l  a a i  
ahipfdag ia m lo * .
be el«o m alo M  te # l te a te  «dvtea, te ip p ia »  
in fo lo*  a a i  b i l l  f o r  th e  B ate .
w* bare  ârtete a m i# *  Sxmft on the  m*k,tam»mgh 
th e  te e r lo a a  S tp rmaa  Owsw>Or»Ste®6NU.,f«p am — iiat f f t  $ 
eovmrlag telm  s td p M a t.
MattMpnr f a r  lawtem. gapartmamt.
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t e p t e t e a r  11*1930.
Atteatioa 8r, ^.T.MoD«mo»t 
Speelal Traffte ig œ t.
Joerieen tepre»» Oompimy,
Ô5 Broadimy, 
itow ytok.
Seex 3tr»i-
*0 beg to adrlse delivwing today to tee Reliera teprwo Icmra^t 
uptown office eight (8) eese» printed taatter, Wbioh we would ask yen to kindly 
forward to dOotiaotioa on the 3JS? PSKSIDK» yliilKHir'.eebeduled te wall from 
Sea Fraaoieoo Septettear lOtb.
a Oeaua -  .The Oentrel Boat of Ohiae
13 The Buad,
Shnapbei, China.
#ai9e/aao5
(n/o aemrlora Xxareao Oo.,3ea FreaeleM»»}
Bo .2198 -  ma«Mmrrarat*28 x 81 x  U"
21te -  " te  X 81 X U*
mx> -  " 89 % te  % Mr
z m .  -  " t e  % 1? % * "
-  « 89 * 18 *
8898 -  •  8» X IS *  » -
830* - * te  X 80 * i r
8908 -  * 89 * 20 *  I f
Total value 09,600.00 '
% tal groea «eight — 1630 lb»,
8e eoeloae oaur a l^ t dxeft 9e>.S?7, for the a** of $  #,10?#te_ 
liadly ettaoh to the h ill of ladlag for thie bate end forrard i t  to  y tm r  &wmgbal 
Gfftoe.
9e also eaoloae ahippenr*s daoleratloa,la dupllmte.oraexlng these
oaoes.teioh are relag S txtrm rd  oalleot;bo#erw, we wish to ;wepra all temrgee thmo^dt 
to teaa^iei.
Kindly hr»© your ©gent telegrrab as tea date this efeeseer eatually eaila.
Yoora veëy truly.
Xa Maneger far Beeteira DepeJPteeet.
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3 e p t « s ^ e r  1 2 , 1 9 3 0 ,
À tten tio Q  Mr, W.T.McOerasott 
S p e c ia l  T r a f f i c  A gent.
A m e r ic a n  E x p r e s s  ( k m p e n y ,
65 B ro a d w a y ,
Sew  Y o r k .
D e a r  S i r s *
S© « Q o lo s e  h e r e w i t h  B a i lw a y  B x p r e e a  A g e n c y 's  r e c e i p t  I t o ,  1 ^2 5 .4 7 7  
c o v e r i n g  8  b o x e s  -  T h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k  o f  O i l t t a ,  S h a n g h a i ,  a a  p e r  o u r  
l e t t e r  o f  y e a t a r d e y ' s  d a t e .
Y o u r s  v e r y  t r u l y ,
M a n a g e r  F a r  E a s t e r n  D e p a r t m e n t ,
IB
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A m e r ic a n  Ex i r^ e s s  € o m i»a n y
AMr.HiCAX tXI^WtSS. SV-stRM iNftiÇyNATlONTAX. SkRVICK
-^ T r a v k l  -  S m p R l N G
To fix 
Cf»ï S Ë f  " g C U S T O M S  B h o k k H ^  M A 4< lN 't I s s i - R A - V O K ;
G k n k k a i .  P o h k u ^ x  A o r . s T S  > 2 k w  V o r k  C k s t r a i *  L i n e î ï
M k M B F R  S T K a M S H U ’  C l t E J O M T  Î Î R O K K K 5  A S .S O C I A T I O N
Gv? B HO AD WAV, New York
S ep t, 12. 1930.
; T f ^ A l T I - n  l > K J ' A » t T M E  M T
Amerloeui Bank Bote C o ., 
70 Broad S t r e e t ,
Bew Y ork , B. Y.
R g K c m  Y o r iL E -
Gentlemen :ç  A t te n t io n  Mr. G.W .Î. Coaubs,
M anager, f a r  Baa t e r n  D ep t.
8 C ases, Bos. 2 1 9 3 /2 ^ 5 .  The C e n tra l  Bank o f 
C hina, S h an g h a i, C hina, to  oonneast w ith  th e  
s / s  PESSIDSHT FHXMDBE, from  San. FrasBSisoo,
S e p t. 1 9 . 1930._________________________________
R e fe r r in g  to  you r l e t t e r s  o f  th e  l l l â i  and 1 2 th , 
co v e rin g  th e  above sh ipm en t.
In  exchange f o r  th e  e x p re s s  r e c e i p t ,  #e en c lo se  
o f f ic e  copy o f  our B/B 5351, suadL b i l l  fo r  $ 4 7 7 ,8 3  fo r  idiich 
we s h a l l  be ^ a l  to  have your prom pt re m it ta n c e .
As in  th e  p a s t ,  i n  com pliance w ith  yom r w ish es, we 
a re  sen d in g  th r e e  sig n ed  c o p ie s  o f o u r b /L  5261 to  o u r 
Mr. R.A. F o u lk s , w ith  y o u r d r a f t ,  r e q u e s t in g  t h a t  he a rran g e  
c o l l e c t io n  in  accordance w ith  in s t r u c t io n s  be i s  to  re c e iv e  
from y o u r V ic e -P re s id e n t ,  Mr. B arry  G. Payne, a t  P e ip in g , o r  
your r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  Mr. George H. L y n o tt, a t  Hoaagkong, 
e i t h e r  o f  whom, a s  your p re v io u s  l e t t e r  in a tru c ta s ,  have 
a u th o r i ty  to re q u e s t  d e l iv e r y  o f  goods fo r  an  amioant l e s s  
th an  th a t  s t a t e d  in  the  d r a f t .  Me a re  a l s o  in fo rm in g  Mr. F ou lks
14
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XUKÛM roKSMJf TSAmo ZkXNiJttaanrx
y a  c w w  f 0 .  f  c î L .
cumas juwmmm. irrs jk lix i.
A»«TBra<MI
l ^ u B o v  j r s x n n n  ComAOTom C is n o M u  B e o a o a »  KAmnem IsnnntASCB
T l »  W A a n iîM G T O N  S t .  
N * W  'V O B K
AFKICA & >UUA MiNCBM
M Adorloa» Baak le te  Oe,
B/B » « .
'/L
o r  hS. B. N o .
TO Broad 3%., %## York Oily________
To A m e r ic a n  E x p r e s s  Co m p a n y , db.
INTERNAHOKAT- B A N K IN G . m i P P Î N G  
A N B  T R A V E L  
GKNKIUX POBXZCOr AGSXT9 fO M  
N*rw T o s x  C i c r n u i .  L o K m
kXTSw QOOTKO OJ» mrojTT Asro Kxvoanr •xanac.mm » t sarrs**» o# 
rmxtiMiT. auuEnrx ja n  tviav» nvttmAXCs <mr «oom ot nLucwn*
KPrscTw» *T evmmatn  cv« tom  awwtw
A-marxMu> to jtv a «*»*• o r jMcrrmnwc*» swlot*». wrsctAi, 
mxmeoTK#. eouLconurr « u n .
SOUTH AMERICA 
M M M c a  A t » c a
E. B. No........
 ----------  ^JQPBXSS COM BAirr.
T« eh#»g## *a 8 #&«*«, **«. 8188/8M 8, Tiüé# 
*»W 8, term »  IM O#, t # « l  w a s e m m S  i t / r ,  
«•mi^aô*} 8BSBS te«grSmi S tlS  #*M 6#», 
ammghml, iM tlfir wm# ##** # f  Sxp**##
6e. la s * , a n # a l ,  m m »  MKAmd A* OsaSnO. 
Baak e f  Ghlaa, SteaagSai» Chlaa.
fraaqpoT tatleB  S#w Tark te  8am FMuaMwa. #A 
$18,8# per 100 I b a . ,  plm» XOff p e r  aaeS $180 
o r f m e t io a  S M reaf, ea Tala# f f f H  • —
tra a a p o r ta t lo a  aaâ th#  ohmrg* o f  %• 0oa#m^ 
Mb F raaalsM  to  f .o .b .  
a t  8^ «& rnlmem» —
%»
©»r 
s to a m r
«rmmglmg 
 a t  mmrngkai.
i aois
: & o "ah or# ohargoa m ta r  to  Im arieaa S n ro a a  
I Ooapamy 1111 o f  la& tag ##881» aa& are  aBbjoet 
I to  a l l  term* and ooRaitlOBs o f m #  1111 o f 
I l a & l B g .
8S
80 $ 4 f T i 8S
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A l^ IE R IC A N  E X P R E S S  C O M P A ]!fY
AXERXCAX W R t S A  S t S lX M
roREK»» o m c K sEUROPE
IsrrKHXATIONAl.
^  , l^gEKIXG -  SH im X O  -  TRAVEL
Il*rinu«
AMERICAN ETCPmS! 
F«BEH»r
EÜROfPE
fsOwr-^kM^O"
av«5e-aw(3«*aU#OK
>» »V»r iT«t£T 
i(  JTKl «T
Z» e»«'OAO »T#tcr 
•I» MO#( VTMfr SIfittT 
•7  f&ACt Ot Ht»» 3t  «UC RCVALC 
• «ûvtCVAWe *»Ok»»*t MM
2* « Iv*i»SI.»M
# & » : M  4 * ^ 0
«  n O t H C X S  M A H A L  «3 CHM# L)T T%H&T»A&St
3 4  » A M M M Q 7 S 7 » A U (  
3« MiÀÜ» »»*«•<*
■.AALf S Mê AtAZlA Otf
« « . O B l H t t  »  V « » ' r 3 » » * A * U O » * S
LVCC»A( $*AHaHÙT(kW*fK)«,ML
•J:.-’ 79 a»HNM&r&''»ASSt
»i »r*D>u«> «TBtcr 
*»•., »# M H ,0»«SiTfltCT
6 C * » 4 r » H r ! '» O I * L t  » »  < 0 ‘^« rt> O A , EAWA7*
W R E t O ^ ^ E î O I î T ;  
CO^CTORS.
C u s t o m s  B r o k e r s  
H a ju n e  I n s u r a n c e
A O T T t n C A H•“iftX&A—
CO»C*>M*6tH
O e n e r a j -  F o r e i g n  a g e n t s  K e w  Yo r k  C e s t r j m .  L i n e s
F o r e i g n  T t i ^ m c  D e p a r t m e n t  
S h i p p i n g  a n »  C u s t o m s  D t v i s i o n s
«DHa MOW* MA
TfOHO**0**H
SII»«<L»0»«
w mwt scAsai 
O t *  A t ? 4 r i 4  t t w »  I S  
2 rf«LC3 ftROf
4M » » « t  C A H K t O l i » t  
4: ovE »u c&M«»ts
I 9UCEMS STRCCT
II OlAJAHOAHOM 
OCS WtWOCAOtfHTMAL
ITS VrCTOOiA 00*3 
L.I7& nOTtL t«S7 7»M»a»MTA-CWO 
A OAWHItWtlL 9TAICT 
4 M  MAKOV A«AS 
COLL.7CA «UAT
San 'F ran cisco  C a l i f o r n ia  
Septem ber 19, 1930
A T R iC A  A > 0  A * I A  MTHOR
SOUTH AMJCRICA 
outAOSMOCs »Mrm»vQM£ Hirax »
.L7J708
jf Am erican Bank ilo te Company 
70 -^road S t r e e t ,
. a  sw—ï o r  k - » ~ --------—
T . ^L f c /  / 2 i  ^  c h ^
A t t ’n . H r. u.W ,?.Combs
B /L
We beg to  a d v ise  t h a t  your shipm ent covered by
  __   , yo u r re fe re n c e  ._ -kÇ .? .t® E _Ë ® 2_ l2^_^_ü î 1 9 3 0
c o n s is t in g  o f —,E lgh.t_ t.8L )-
consigned  to Ords
S h an g h a i, C hina.
was fo r sa rd e d  from  ------------------ :— ,
p e r  S / S  - m . I . o n R  .  s a i l e d  S n p t R m M r . i g .  1 9 3 0
I f  consignee  shou ld  f in d  i t  n e ce ssa ry  to  make any
in q u i r i e s  re g a rd in g  t h i s  sh ipm en t, th ey  should  communicate
Kith   _A a e rl  cm i-ExprÊLE s ...i? o * In  ............ ..... .......................
S h an g h ai, O in a .________________________ ___
Yours t r u l y ,
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, 
•Foreign T ra f f ic  D ept. , 
Exoort D iv is io n .
By. zi: D. LSIOHTOilj
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A m e r i c a n  E x p r e s s » C o m p a n y
SH IPPIN G  AGESTTS
V O  AND FROM ALL FARTS O F THE ««MWIEHCIAL. WORLD 
O FFU CES O F (CO M PA NIES C O N S T IT U T IN G  T i g  AWMERICWN EX PRESS SYSTEM*• wMiiB»* m4«i?-
UNITED s t a t e s ;  AND C tO fA D A  Y -  EUROPE EUFK5PEAwtwcAN THC AWCWCaN iJjfWJjH CO.. INC.
wii^raSasco __
SSK, 5 0 % .
S S S ,« o .
RECEIVED fmm_
JMMWCUN CWWjCta CO.. ». A. I.
m
tONOON
UVOfi»0€K.
SOUTHAMPTtNl
(MWeUNOM
m m geatmmrmmM
MANIIA PtKittQMONO XMQ CAiwrr*
SumOHM Tftwr»»»
ftOMMV YOKOHAMA
KBUWUM
JteEJÜUâL
(B/L No.—# # & ____ Booking So.
mm t^xiam Mwfc «»*# Ab._____
•SCHOSAtNO
WMasft«r *# *• $b* #wppw)
p w w rt of w m p w y . x o i a r t ii p e o a iM ar or oWwr n u r lv r  w»4/ef
------------------------ -------------- ' — "        * ---------  i  vrtm tiovm
Mt by ih« twst Of «xAor
KTsttsâu «(« .iw r or fcijsr »  th#.#r»i -of — 
n O  St S07 port Of EMM# io  «  -OKS « f  Ow
#«%, k #  %#
OELSTINATIOK---------------------------------------------- g .
w o T iry -
«be torn o* o r ^ '  Uwteai aàn s w  sod sd d rw  of VNnr «e w oMY m*a of «mroti «  *% tof#*a pOcY MtoiSd
SUSJCCr TO «OMMECnON
■TSBEHT
%o eatnSwsi a m  #f I 
« h l m #
m M u m t t t  ■ w itm »
tsBBT «») crnm m à  m- 
wrtsifl tsxxm msm
o u n c  wCAsu
Y K Ü *  « m u m t  
m i x  k s » # M a
i m i  ■. m f i f
... .  e«megr #*$ ii«M« m a o h m m i w s i  xmo mt ■___  ,  .
*«#«om ,s  %r m f •o'w.tmi i l» < *»#m  #* w o m  k i  ‘m n §  m  . |  -i
%  « y  m # »#  f i i w t  m i w i w u i
C O P Y  F O R  O F H C P  U S E
Amity to r doürcrjr wl^
T9E AM Z& jfCA X  ZXM*E@@ CO M P& JfT <brfsto rcC tm d to  so C eo taum m am ew . stib toc t.tto  Tbe tonsu  sad  «mmiKitoao » a  the -toe# so d  
  - ___
T he O w n e u ir  owy «orm.re^CBe d ttaam m  «■ room ** Sw- o r s n o a m  f o r t t o  V o  m ini l e l  o»d^ *ho a rapet i y  oSot*  m o sh S m . * ( th *  to  -to* osm o o l theK» f  "«/K ' ........................  . . . . .
a r ia t ik la rv n tsm « b o n d e r <K'—  ------
* ts r r io f -  NttOto th e  XJtotod B em » m d /o c   -----------
o r  to# tAwAMse s m î m i  Corawietom m d  to# «sMe* sa d  K septftoai •‘Csrttor**"wBh — ------ .-- •-   -
II toe wofd Ymr#*''
m wr e —WP* «ew sti*^ 0 (mmt «» #«• »**»» Q» w
j A f
■ of * m  MVosooBaesrt
     '
T K o y s p o w T A T T O ia t  to»si> o M g B » g  o r  t h b  <«>M 3*A?fY y o B ^ a # g t o ? w f w e  m a t ^ ;
AT _ m cm  AMOUMT
a n r t t o m  m p s * .  a # a # r . c  # W to # .: . j
W »  MWtNto.-.Wt. M srtofl nw a. tffiWliWI. N t  a m . >Vn 'W # r t  * ■ ■
... m m  .aom toov#sA #m *S '4
: . r  m s m  Yes .
s M ftn -f ir r  .....................
om ouiis?sB « DLssanoiïTŒf ' AM TASim os
coN B inoK s oy
Trsa#por**Woo oborce# doom*# todmd* d * s *  for dotto*. 000*00 
«# «TP«C0M. or toM sose to  eeioM m e* loom: eddrew . Tb* totpo«*. tiwH«i 
<of Mu> otoroemoiA -rm ettttortt to »  ozpeaoe# W  eowoase o o v y . tss*#) 
o r espeoee# to r *toroi*m. t rh o ra m  totooor. e s rtm n . iK&tors«*. beâMto*.
p : . y 3 = a r a ? = w  Nr .
T = - J = S l . ' L 5 r z t a Z r % L % =  M T L t Z W
or r#Tt»o# to # ' im  o w rw  fo r  fM w m a esemrssee, port o r U n a to s! idnr#*#
a n y  to iw o aai aon  ^toe s to pw ty  aha** deecHbed on béhmtf of to* shipper. 
1 0 ?  e tr ty n an  m »' i to H t 0» ia a in n e u  m  # m « m  and  th e  *a»«aw r^ to m rso M  
pe* artto OS* WOP**#» tBtotfsae# Comps Ole# or- « ta# r rado rV rno r*  to  be
f g z g â ç a : ________ -
n  bmsM)- bto M m friim  o r  to s t  too, prepartgr sbooe toeertoed to cm beard  s a y
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Illustration 1 : Sun Fo, son o f Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, arriving in New York aboard the S.S. 
Majestic on 31 July 1928. Sun would be meeting with members o f the financial 
community in hope o f obtaining loans for China. Photo courtesy o f Bettman/CORBIS 
images.
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Illustration 2: Kemmerer China Group Picture. The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, box 100, 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Illustration 3: S.S. M adison. . .enroute to China with Kemmerer and party. The Edwin 
Kemmerer Papers, box 100, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, New Jersey.
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Illustration 4: Dockside photo o f  Shanghai showing Customs Building and Clock Tower. 
The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, box 100, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton 
University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Illustration 5: Portrait Photo o f Kemmerer. The Edwin Kemmerer Papers, box 505, 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
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Illustration 6: Central Bank o f China 10-Cent CGU Note— 1930. Source: The Arthur
Young Papers.
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Illustration 7: Central Bank o f China 20-Cent CGU Note— 1930. Source: The Arthur
Young Papers.
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Illustration 8: Central Bank of China 1 CGU Note— 1930. Source: The Arthur Young 
Papers.
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Illustration 9: Central Bank o f  China 5 CGU Note— 1930. Source; Author’s personal
collection.
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Illustration 10: Central Bank o f China 20 CGU Note— 1930. Source: Author’s personal
collection.
RES77y*)H
TWENTY CUSTOMS S m O  UNITS
IB .
R E S 7 7 S (m  %
wmWw* »tMi* <4 ««- i
128
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
Illustration 11 : Central Bank o f China 50 CGU Note— 1930. Source: Author’s personal
collection.
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Illustration 12: Central Bank o f China 100 CGU Note— 1930. Source: Author’s personal
collection.
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Illustration 13: Central Bank o f China 500 CGU Note— 1947. Source: Author’s personal
collection.
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Illustration 14: Central Bank o f  China 2000 CGU Note— 1947. Source: Author’s 
personal collection.
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